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1. SUl1HARY': This is another petition presenting 
an issue concerning the overlap of United States v. Chaj_~_i r.::_~, 
433 U.S. 1 (1977), and the automobile search exception. Here 
the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the warrantless search 
of resp's suitcase, which the police seized from the trunk of 
a taxicab in which resp was riding, was unreasonable ancJ thus 
---------in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
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2. FACTS: Little Rock police were provided information 
by an informant that resp had taken an empty green suitcase to 
Dallas for the purpose of transporting marijuana back to Little 
Rock and that he was scheduled to arrive back in Little Rock 
during the afternoon of April 23, 1976. Three plainclothes - . 
policemen were waiting at the ~rt when resp arrived. They 
observed him get off a plare that had come from Dallas and then 
proceed to the baggage area. There he picked up a green suitcase, 
which he handed to a man ~vhom he met there, David Rambo. Resp 
then went outside the terminal and got in a taxicab. He was joined 
by Rambo, who placed the green suitcase in the trunk of the cab. 
The officers followed the cab as it left the air port and 
traveled down a major street in Little Rock. They reques ted 
assistance from a marked police car over their radio, an d tha t car 
eventually stopped the cab. The cab driver was asked to get out 
--of the car and to open the trunk, which he did. Resp and Rambo 
were taken out of the cab by the police and placed agains t the 
side of the vehicle, while the police looked in the trunk. Without 
seeking anyone's consent, the officei:s opened the unlo cked green 
suit case and found 9.3 pounds of marijuana. Resp and Rambo wer e 
placed under arrest and taken to the police station. 
Resp was charged with possession of marijuana with intent 
to deliver. His motion to suppres s the marijuana was denie d by 
the trial court, and he ~vas convicted following a jury t r ial. Res p 
\\7 a s sentence d to 10 yea r s 1 impris onment and fined $15,000. 
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On appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the 
conviction, holding that the search of the suitcase violated 
the Fourth Amendment. The court agreed with the State that 
the police officers had probable cause to believe the resp's 
suitcase contained a controlled substance. Nevertheless, it 
held that there were no exigent circumstances permitting the 
search to be conducted without a warrant. It rejected the 
State's argument that the search fell within the automobile 
exception, noting that the Court had stated in United States 
v. Chadwick, supra, that the factors diminishing the privacy 
aspects of an automobile do not apply to a person's suitcase . 
Furthermore, said the court, the suitcase's mobility did not 
justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant 
Clause. Once the police had ~eized the suitcase from the trunk 
of the cab and had it under their exclusive control, "there. wa.s 
~------------------------------
not the slightest danger that the suitcase or its contents could 
have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtain-
ed." Thus the police should have obtaine d a ·warrant before 
searching it. 
3. CONTENTIONS: The State argues that the decision 
below is in conflict with decisions of this Court concerning the 
automobile search exception. In particular, the decision is a t 
odds with ~ambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. L~2 (1970), for there the 
Court said that for constitutional pu1~poses tl.leJ~ e was no dif-
ference between, on the one hand, seizing a car and holding it 
until a warrant is obtained and, on the other hand) cm~ry:i.ng out 
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an immediate search of the car·without a warrant. The State 
argues that the same should be true in this case; if it was 
permissible for the officers to seize the suitcase under the 
automobile exception, then an immediate search of the suit-
case should also be constitutional. 
The Arkansas Supreme Court also misinterpreted the 
Court's holding in Chadwick, says the State. The decision 
below could lead to the elimination altogether of the automobile 
exception, for applying the reasoning of the Arkansas court, one - ----------------------------------------------could argue in many circumstances that the. car itself was under 
the complete control of the police and thus a warrant to search 
was required. The State says that other courts have held that 
Chadwick is not applicable to automobile searches, even when 
luggage contained within the car is among the objects searched. 
Accordingly, the State argues, the decision below is in conflict 
with various decisions of federal courts of appeals and state 
supreme courts. 
4. DISCUSSION: We have had several petitions th i s 
year questioning the applicability of Chadwick to the automob i l e 
search situation. As far as I know, this is the first decision 
to conclude that Chachvick is applicable in such a case. The 
decision of the Arkansas court certainly f i nds some support in 
Chadwick, for there the Court did note the differences be t ween .:1 
person's privacy expectations with regard to his car an d with 
regard to his luggage. See 433 U.S., at 13. Moreover, the Court 
relied on the fact that once the federal agents had s e ized the 
~u~ -----
- 5 - ~~ 
~ 
footlocker in that case and had gained exclusive control 
:;;:;~ over it, there was no danger of it or its contents being 
Nevertheless, } 
contention in ~ 
removed before a warrant could be obtained. 
the Court expressly stated that there was no 
Chadwick that the automobile search exception was applicable. 
\ 
(The footlocker had just been placed in the trunk of a 1 ~ arked 
car at the time it was seizedo) ....._ 
-
Justice Brennan's concurring 
~
opinion also makes it clear that that decision did not decide 
whether a warrantless search would have been valid if the 
footlocker had been seized after the defendants had driven away 
with it in their car . He states in a footnote: "While the IAJ) } ~ S 
contents of the car could have been searched pursuant to the ? 
auto)llobile exception, it is by no means clear that the. contents VV"" 
of locked containers found inside a car are subject to searyh n •. ~~ 
under this exception, any more than they would be if the p~~ 
found them in any other place." (Here the suitcase was not 
locked.) 
~
Should the Court he interested in considering the 
scope of Chadwick and its applicability to searches of suitcases 
found within automobiles, this appears to be a good case for 
doing so . 
There is no response. 
5/26/78 
ME 
Gibson Opinion in 
Petition 
lUi Ill~ ~u~ a~ uuo~ ~vu 
Mr. Justice Brannan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Jus t i ce White 
Mr . Justice Mdrshall 
Mr . JustLoe PJN~l l 
Mr . Jus t :L c~ R l1r , ~lu.ist 
Mr . Justice SLavens 
From: Mr . J us t ice Blackmun 
Circulated : __________ _ 
1st DRAFT Recirculated: SEP 2 7 1978 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
STATE OF ARKA);"SAR v. LOi'\i'\IE JAMES SANDERS 
ON PETITION FOR WHlT OF' CEWI.'fOHAHI '1'0 'l'HE 8UPHEME COURT 
01<~ AllKANSAS 
No. 77- 1-JW. Dt'<'ilkcl October -, 107 
Mn. JesTIChl BLACKMUN. disse11ting. 
This case is illustrativr of the difficulties and the confusion 
that United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1077) , has 
spawrwcl. If the C'ourt)s decision in Chadwick is correct (a 
proposition 1 srriously douht. for 1 was in dissent there, id., 
at 17), the Court. instead of being reluctant. ought forthwith 
to assume the task of clarifying the resulting confusio11. 
Law enforr.ement authorities. the accused , am! courts alike 
deserve to know and to b<> advised as to what, if anything, is 
required befor<> a container- locked or unlocked, box, handbag, J 
briefcasf'. envelop;poUCh. or luggage-present in an a utonlo-
hile may be se1zef or examilW< when therP is probable cause 
to believe it contains a controlled substa.nce or other contra-
band. Jf tlwre remains any automobile exception after 
Chadwick , as the Court professrd. id., at 12. its boundaries 
should be establishrd now. 1 therefore agree with MR . .JusTICE 
WHrrJoJ that th<' ( 'ourt should grant crrtiorari in this case, and 




To: The Chief Justice 
Mr . JusticG Brennan 
Mr. Just:Lce Stewart 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Y· Justice Blackmun Mr. Just:i.ce Powell 
Mr. Justice RJhnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevans 
From: Mr. Justice White 
Circulated: ~~ 7 
1st DRAFT 
Recirculated: __________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m 
STATE OF ARKA"\'SAS v. LONNIE JAMES SA~DERS 
ON FETl'l'TON FOR WHI'r OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF ARKANSAS 
To. 77- 1497. Decicl<-cl October -, 197 
MH. JoBTICE vrHJTE, chssc>nting. 
This casr pr<'srn ts tlw issLw whether thr Fourth Amcnd-
nwnt prohibits a11 immediatr warrantless search of an un--loehcl st.!,itcasc' found Jll the trunk of a vchiclf' stopJwd by 
officers w1th ( )l'obable eausr to believe tlw suitcase contains 
C'ontraban<l. The• Rupren1e Court of Arkansas held that it 
clof's. finding that the exJwctation of privacy in a suitcase, 
rvrn an unlocked onC'. is .sig;-uficanWy '"gre~ter tha7, tha£ sm1ply 
iu the automobih' itselr-~v. 'StaTe, "2~ lrrk. 5!1b,559 
R. ~i't"'1tr4tffim. Though a suitcase• is easily moveable. 
tlw court held that that c•xigent circumstance \<\'aS vitiated once 
tlw police• had S<'iZ<'<l the suitcase and placrcl it within their 
rxcl usi w c~o n tro 1. 
I11 n•aehing its conclusion. the court below relied in part on 
our deciswn in United States\'. Chadwick, 433 l'. R. 1 (1977) , 
though that case invol v<>d a locked footlocker and no con ten-
Lion. in this Cow·t. thaCtlw automobile search exception was 
applicabk. SincP Chaau~ick, the federal courts of appe~s 
have n•achcd conftJCting decisions on whether immediate war-
rantless S<:'arches of luggagf' found in an automobile are per-
lnissibh• as falling within tlw scope of a warrantless vehicle 
Hearch. ( 'oillparc [I niterl States \'. Stev·ie, :No. 77-1335 (CA8 
t'll bane Aug. 15. 1D7R) (finding the search unlav .. ·ful undf'r 
Chadwick) . ·with Umted States " · Finnegan, 561-\ F. 2d 637 
(CA9 1977) (upholdi11g the search). Se<' also U11Ued States 
\ . jl!fontuumery, 558 F. 2d :~11 (CA5 per curiam) (on petition 
for rchearlllg) ( rc•serving tlH• istiUC). Prior to Chadwick, the 
fe(kral courts had lllllformly h<' ld that once a y(•hicle is sub-
J<~\"1ul \\ arhititTc::'iH sra?cfi SUitcases inwle the vc:ri"icle 
2 AllKAKS.\S v . .. ·A~DERS 
may also bP O]wnrd and SC'archrd without wanant. E. g., 
United tates v. Chuke, 554 F . 2d 2 977); United 
States v. McCambridge, ;)51 F. 2d R65 ~1977); Uuited 
States v. 'I'ramu11ti, 513 F. :2d 1087 vcxzy, cert. cknicd, 423 
U. fl. 832 (1!)75 · ['uited States v. "sariano, 4!!7 F. 2d 147 
(C'A5 Pn batt D74) 
My eolleagues failurr to S('iZE' this opportuttity to t'esolve 
the Rquarc conflict and elarify the implicatiot1S of Chadwick 
<l<'ttiet=: IH'e<kd guidatle(' to ittdividuals seckinv; to assure theil' 
privacy and law enforcemc'nt officials seeking to operate within 
constitutional constraints. The question prE'sc·nt<'d will one 
day have to h(' <:Utswered by thi~:> Court. In thP nwantinw, 
the' Fourth AtnrtHlment will mean somethiug in some jurisdic-
tions that it will not mean in others. Because assuring that 
th<' Constitution stands for the' same things throughout the 
Nation is a central purpOS(' and obligation of this Court, I 




.:§uprttttt ~curlllf tlrt ~tb .:§hrl:tg 
... ufri:ttgtan. ~. ~· 2ll,?~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
September 27, 1978 
Re: No. 77-1497 Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, .r u 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
~- ~L.A..--' 
1-o ~ ~f-1/~, 
77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
MR. JUSTICE S~EVENS, concu~ring. 
~ 
J ·.-t1'"' 3 Brennan 
Ur. Just1-oa Stewart 
Jir. :Just toe t7h1 te . 
Mr. J~Gtioe t!a.rahall · 
ttr. .Justice Ble..olanun 
J::r • . Tust1oe Powell ../ 
Mr. 1ustioe . Rabnqu1at 
~: Dr. Just~oe Stevens 
~1roulatedr $rl 2 8 · 
Recirculated:------
Occasionally an order denying certiorari does ind~cate that 
the Court has shirked i ts duty to resolve important and clear 
cut conflicts among the Ctrcuits.l1 This, however, ~s not 
such a case because the asserted conflict is i11usorv. 
In the only post-Chadwick~/ case relied upon bv 
petitioner to establish the "conflict" with this, or anv other 
case, the court held: 
"[E]ven rif] Chadwick applies and requires a ru1ing that 
the search of the suitcase was unlawful, we would 
nevertheless be compe,led to affirm rbecausel the a~miss~on 
into evidence of the fru~ts of the search was harm1esR 
beyond a reasonable doubt." untted States v. Finnegan, S~8 
F.2d 637, 642 (CA9 1977). -
1/ Compare Mansfield v. Estelle, No. 77-2517 (~AS Feb. Q, 
1'9"78), cert. denied, No. 77-6709 ( 1978), '"ith, e.g., 
United States v. Neff, 525 F. 2d 3111 (<:A8 ll:l75) ~ compare Un,.ted 
States v. Lacey, No. 77-1450 (~A2 March 31, 1q78), ce~t. 
den1ed, No. 77-1751 ( lq78), with United States v. 
Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (CA9 Jq77). 
2/ It is of course irreleyaut .that the result in this case 
conflicts with the result in other cases ci. teCI by petitioner 
that were decided before Chadwick clarified the law in this 






This r.ourt need not expend its scarce resources resolving 
"conflicts" created by dicta or aJternat~ve holdings. 
Moreover, even the alternative holding in Finnegan does not 
conflict with the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in this 
case.l/ I am therefore persuaded that the Court has acted 
wisely jn refusing to hear this particular case on the merits. 
As is so often true, the op~nions dissenting from the denial or 
certiorari create an unwarranted imp~ession. 
3/ Finnegan involved the stop and search of a vehicle owned by 
the driver-suspect based on information unrelated to the 
possible contents of luggage: the search of the , ug.g.age- was 
incidental to a complete search of the vehicle. In this case, 
by contrast, the police stopped a taxicab because they had 
probable cause to believe a suitcase placed in the cab by a 
passenger contained marijuana. As in Chadwick, there was 
nothing to prevent them, after seizing the suitcase, from 
obtaining a warrant before thev opened it. Accord, United 
States v. Stevie, No. 77-1335 (CA8 en hanc A.ug. it;, 1q7g). 
Even 1f correctly applied in Finnegan, the so-called 
"automobile exception" is irrelevant in this case because, as 
was true in Chadwick, ther~ .~as no search of the vehicle. 
/' 
. . .. 
Court .................... · 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . 






September 25, 1978 
. ,,r I Voted on .................. , 19 . . . 
Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 






N POST DIS AFF 
MERITS MOTION 
ABSENT 
REV AFF G D 
No. 77-1497 
NOT VOTING 
Burger, Ch. J .................... ·> .................................................... . 
Brennan, J .............................................................................. . 
Stewart, J ......................... Y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... . 
White, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .(. i./ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ ~ .. ·1 '/(_ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
Blackmun, J ................ · · · .~ ·~ ' . · ~ .~ · :~~. ~~"-rr · · · · ~ : ~ .~~e--: · · · · · ............ . 
Powell, J ............................................................................... . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... . 
Stevens, J ........................... . 




I am persuaded by the dissents circulated by Byron 
and Harry that we should grant this case to resolve the . 
conflict that already exists, and to try - difficult as 
it may be - to give guidance to law enforcement: autnorities 
who are confronted daily with automobile search questions. 
·, Thus, I will change my vote to a grant. I believe 





~npr.enu Q}ltttrl ttf tlft ~ ~hdtg 
JfagJ.rittghm. ~. QJ. 2Ilgt'!$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
September 28, 1978 
Re: 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Chief: ' ' 
If the four votes to grant certiorari in this 
case remain firm, I wonder if we should consider 
directing the parties to argue the question whether 
Chadwick is retroactive. You will note that this 
case 1nvolves a pre-Chadwick search. May we discuss 
this suggestion at our next Conference? 
Respectfully, 
fL 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
. --
~u:prttnt QJ'ttnrt ttf tqt ~tb $)mug 
:Was!p:ttgLm. ~. <!J. 2llbT~? 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
September 28, 1978 
Re: No. 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Harry: 
I have already joined Byron's dissent from the denial 
of certiorari in this case d would likewise join yours 
except for the fact tha Lewis' note indicating that he now 
intends to vote to gran lOrari means that this case will 
turn out to be a "grar:.,t". I shall, therefore, await our 
next Conference, intending to stand by my vote to "grant" in 
this case. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
, ..., .. .,.....,. ._.,., 0 o o o 1 o o o o o o o o o o o o •J .£Vo o o 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 .. . 
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To: Justice Powell 
Re: Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497 
Here is my first draft in Sanders--refreshingly short, 
as you will see. I hope that I have covered everything. We 
have taken the liberty of having Paul edit the draft before you 
saw it, as we thought that you might not want to plunge right 
into opinions. The copy included herewith represents our joint 
efforts. There is one change Paul made that I am not certain 
of. Originally the final two paragraphs of footnote 13 were in 
the text, just before the last paragraph of the opinion. Paul 
thinks this comes as an afterthought. We agreed that I would 
place the material in the footnote and then ask for your views. 
I hope this doesn't hurt your digestion any. 
3/21/79 David 
DW 3/21/79 
Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497 
First Draft (edited by Paul) 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether police are 
required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken 
from an automobile properly stopped and searched for 
the 
~~~-Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve some l\~sion ill the 
' 
~~~~~r~~~he application of our decision in 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), to warrantless 
1 
searches of luggage seized from automobiles. 
I 
On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little 
Rock, Arkansas, Police Department received word from an 
informant that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive 
aboard an American Airlines flight at gate number one at the 
Municipal Airport of Little Rock, Arkansas. According to the 
informant, respondent would be carrying a green suitcase 
containing marihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew 
respondent well, as in January of 1976 the informant had given 
2. 
the Little Rock Police Department information that had led to 
respondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana. 
Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers 
placed the airport under surveillance. As the informant had 
~ predicted, respondent arr1ved a~ ~ . 3~ at gate one. The police 
~ 
watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a waiting 
taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met a man whom 
police subsequently identified as David Rambo. While Rambo 
waited, respondent retrieved from the airline baggage service a 
green suitcase matching that described by the informant. 
Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went 
outside, where he entered the taxi into which he had put his 
luggage. Rambo waited a short while in the airport and then 
joined respondent in the taxi, after placing the green suitcase 
in the trunk of the vehicle. 
When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent, 
Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow 
officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car, 
stopped the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the 
request of the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his 
vehicle, where the officers found the green suitcase. Without 
asking the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police 
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to be 
9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in ten plastic bags. 
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged 
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in 
2 
violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-2617 (1976). Before trial, 
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court held a 
hearing on January 31, 1977, and ~ denied the suppression 
motion without by a jury on 
February 3, 1977, to ~ ten years 
in prison and ~ fined $15,000. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed 
respondent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should 
have suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through 
an unlawful search of the suitcase. 262 Ark. 595, 559 S.W.2d 
~~~ed States y. Chadwick, supra, and 
A 
704 (1977). 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 u.s. 443 (1971), the court 
concluded that a warrantless search generally must be supported 
by "probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances." 262 
Ark., at 599, 559 S.W.2d, at In the present case, the 
~ 
court found there 6e ~ ample probable cause for the police 
A 
officers' belief that contraband was contained in the suitcase 
they searched. The court found to be wholly lacking, however, 
3. 
4. 
any exigent circumstance justifying the officers' failure to 
w~~ 
secure a warrant for the search of the luggage. Ne i the-r 
~~~~ 
~e~ ~ ~~ there was no danger thatft~y eo~ l e des troy 
iz=l.. c.,;u~f{' ~,t..c_ ~ LC#&• • ...--cL.t.-4_ ,4, ~ 
t l're= ~ t<l"tfi a---w~PM The court concluded, ~a....L-
. 
therefore, that there was "nothing in this set of circumstances 
that would lend credence to an assertion of impracticality in 
3 
obtaining a search warrant." Id., at 600. 
II 
~IT/' 
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals' privacy and 
security in two important ways. First, it guarantees "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." In addition, this Court has interpreted the ~ 
Amendment to include the 
~4~ 
requirement that~ ~eAe ~ ai searches 
of private property be performed pursuant to a search warrant 
4 
issued in compliance with the warrant clause. See, e.g., 
United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 
317 (1972); Almeida-Sanchez · v. United · States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 
(1973)(Powell, J., concurring); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 
(1925). In the ordinary case, therefore, a search of private 
property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to a 
properly issued search warrant. The mere reasonableness of a 
search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, 
is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required under the 
Fourth Amendment. See United States · v. United States District 
Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v. -New Hampshire, 
403 u.s. 443, 481 (1971), 
[t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of 
our constitutional law for decades, and it has 
determined the result in scores and scores of cases 
in courts all over this country. It is not an 
inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against the 
claims of police efficiency. It is, or should be, 
an important working part of our machinery of 
government, operating as a matter of course to 
check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly over-
zealous executive officers" who are a part of any 
system of law enforcement. 
The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our 
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that 
individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation 
of powers and division of functions among the different 
branches and levels of government." United States · v. United 
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that 
conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search 
"be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable 
assertions of executive authority. See McDonald v~ United 
5. 
~ 4- r··.._,e ~ ~a- " 
~~~C:::~-~ 
5 4.-c.~ 
States, 335 u.s. 451, (1948). 
requirement. 
'-f ~~~.,f. ~ -r<-~·::~ ~...__ 
r @~tNr~s-we.i~.l4.i.Ag~ the public intere j a~ aiL~in.ttwJ:a;~ ---Q f 
~~,i;: ~~u~~ Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s. 
543, 555 (197~& •H€~ we i gAing A&Qe~arily dema nd s sowe 
f~---- ~ •  u;-,_ a-f.e ·w- e-Jloe~tign s RaJ,T.G~@otO;I " je-a.l&bl&-ly a~ 5 /.<_/ 
by the courts to provide for those cases 
where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger 
~rl-
to law officers or the risk ofAdestruction of evidence,~ 
outweigh the =::~a-:t~(1;~t: i~ ~r~ ~ 
~lo 
magistrate. See United States v. United States District Court, 
supra, at 318. But because each exception to the warrant 
' 
~~ t.._.d"'-~~~~~ 
requirement invariablylfr~o~~aees to some extentAthe Fourth ~ ·~ 
j>l»rtJ.- ,;{. ·.., t.ta·~ M a fJ f ?s ~ 
Amendment ~e:l o.f ~~;;i:u:g il:Ch&ilt llill--fJeiies aio~t;gtion, the few 
' situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of 
a warrant have been carefully delineated and "the burden is on 
those seeking the exemption to show the need for it." United 
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). See Chimel · v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Katz v. United States, 
supra, at 357. Moreover, :i:-Ras fl'ltlo€1.-r a ~ eve15¥ e *'Cep.t:i:-en -to -&he 
w.a rrao t.-- r<e Ef~-i'~ emeu t rs t As X' e&~ lt gf a c ar eful ly s t.~;uck 
bal aHee, A the reach of an except ion rtH:~ e.t R.e we r ~e--ee yeH:e A that 
. , I 
uk-..."-f-c•~ 
which is necessary to accomodate the needs of society. See ,. ' 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); United States v. 
Chadwick, ~! ~ 15 (1977); Coolidge · v~ New Hampshire, 403 
/\ 
u.s. 443, 455 (1971). 
One of the circumstances in which the Constitution 
does not require a search warrant is when the police stop an 
automobile on the street or highway because they have probable 
cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. 
See, e.g., Texas v. ·White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975). As the 
Court said in Carroll · v. · United · States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 
(1925), 
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been 
construed, practically since the beginning of the 
Government, as recognizing a necessary difference 
between a search of a store, dwelling house or 
other structure in respect of which a proper 
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a 
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, 
for contraband goods, w9ere it is not practicable 
to secure a warrant •••• 
~~ 
There are~ two reasons for the distinction~ between 
automobiles and other private property. First, as the Court 
repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles 
often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., 
United · States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12; Chambers v. Maroney, 
399 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. · United States, supra. In 
) ~ a..-..c.,e...__ 
addition, WQ. hadHi a:~hanU:Hed t'biit the configuration Cl1"1d history 
/\ 
~4~ ~4a,...,i4-
of automobiles Q..i.soour•g~ the substantial expectation¢ of 
A 
7. 
States · v. Chadwick, supra; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364, 368 (1976). 
III 
the present case, the State argues that the 
search of respondent's suitcase was proper under 
8 
Carroll and its progeny. 'II-A oro ..4-5-- n~ qaEst :i:err bt:1t. tfiat ffttlCS-
i.c ..,U.c .J-
~ /.4,l ~ - IIC #11:&-h CA44•~• ~-·~ -t.-4 -. 
of ~qhat T he pol icei ~ in apprehending respondent and his 
luggage . ,;os-~&<'• 'rlffis-, ~II<! f'<rlie~ ample probable cause 
to believe that respondent's green suitcase contained 
marihuana. A previously reliable informant had provided a 
detailed account of respondent's expected arrival at the Little 
Rock Airport, which account proved to be accurate in every 
detail, including the color of the suitcase in which respondent 
would be carrying the marihuana. Having probable cause to 
believe that contraband was being driven away in the taxi, the 
police were justified in stopping the vehicle, searching it on 
the spot, and seizing the suitcase they suspected contained 
contraband. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970). 
Cfieee~ At oral argument respondent conceded that the stop of 
the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally 
unobjectionable. See Tr. of oral argument at 30, 44-46. 
The only question, therefore, is whether the police, 
9. 
rather than immediately searching the suitcase without a 
warrant, should have taken it w4~fi tfieffi to the police station 
al~ with respondent and obtained a warrant for th~ search. 
a~ ~ ~ <l ~ 
A j(earchejf of luggage generally ~~perfo ur{ua;t :o a 
Jw_~ 
warrant. AJtlst ~we Te~~s a~Q we declined an invitation to 
extend the Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting 
that neither of the two policies supporting warrantless 
searches of automobiles applies to luggage. ~oe ~Aited ~tates zr--
d--- !,: ~""""'C-ft-a.w~, ~pi;.i~.. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers had 
seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their control 
at the time of the search. Consequently, "there was not the 
slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents could have 
been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained." 
'f33 u....s-. 
Id., at 13. 
1\ 
~~~ 
And, as we observed i~ . luggage, unlike 
hc.L. 's • t" 
automobiles, is a common repository for personal effects, and 
A 
therefore is associated with an expectation of privacy largely 
absent with respect to automobiles~ 
The State argues, however, that the warrantless search 
of respondent's suitcase was proper,not because the property 
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an 
automobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street. In 
effect, the State would have us extend Caroll to allow 
warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile, 
...... --
as well as of the vehicle 
~~ 
itself.) Heretofore we have not had 
1 0. 
occasion to rule on the constitutionality of warrantless 
searches of luggage taken from automobiles, as challenged 
searches generally have been of some integral part of the 
automobile. See, e.g., South · Dakota v. Opperman, 428 u.s. 364, 
366 (1976)(glove compartment); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 
(1975)(passenger compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 
433, 437 (1973)(trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44 
(1970)(concealed compartment under the dashboard); Carroll · v. 
United States, 267 u.s., at 136 (behind the upholstering of the 
seats).~In seeking to bring the search of respondent's 
~~ 
suitcase within the exception to the warrant requirement, the 
/\ 
burden is on the State to demonstrate the need for warrantless 
searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles , %ee 
supra, 
We find no reason to extend the Carroll 
10 
as well as of the vehicles themselves. 
as the vehicle in which it rides. 
oct:r1ne to 
the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point 




control. See 433 u.s., at 13. Once police have seized a 
suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no 
way affected by the place from which it was taken. 
44-~~~ 
Accordingly, the~e is no greater need for warrantless searches 
1\ 
of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from 
1 2 
other places. 
Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped 
~
on the highway is notAattended by any lesser expectation of 
L~~,~.:.k 
privacy than is associated with ~r luggageA Swiefy~ne is 
~ ~-
not less inclined to placeJ personal p ssessions in a suitcase 
~~ 
merely because the suitcase is to be 
Jlndeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a 
repository for personal items when one wishes to transport 
U#'r . . a-
them. Accordingly, th~ reasons forA~tf for the 
4A- 4-L .... ~ 
search of~ automobilej~do not apply to searches of ~los€4 
~aken by police from automobiles. Because taere 
I\ 
In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the 
~ 
Fourth Amendment applies toAluggage taken from an automobile to 
~~~~~ .. 
the same degree it applies toj~fi€~ luggageA Thus, insofar as 
the police are entitled to search such luggage without a 
1 2. 
warrant, their actions must b some exception 
to the warrant requirement oth r than that applicable to 
~-~~ \;:I 
automobiles stopped on the high ay. ~ the present caseA the 
1\ 
()-/'-
police, without endangering elves A risking loss of the 
evidence, have detained 
~~~~~ 
ePl~ secured h1s su1 tease, 
~~a.-~~-!"'~ 
delayed the search) until 
after judicial approval had been obtained. In this way, 
respondent's constitutional interest in prior judicial review 
of the search would have been fully served. 





1. Compare United States v; · Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641-42 
(9th Cir. 1977), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 
1178-79 (8th Cir. 1978)(en bane). 
2. In addition to the marihuana found in the suitcase, police 
officers found one ounce of heroin hidden in their patrol car 
after transporting Rambo to police headquarters. Accordingly, 
Rambo also was charged with possession of heroin with intent to 
deliver. Immediately before trial on both counts, the court 
severed the heroin possession count for later trial. 
~ 
~~i~ion ,-rhe court rejected the State's contention that 
A 
luggage is entitled to a lesser protection against warrantless 
searches than are other private areas, such as homes. 
~ noted that suitcases, unlike automobiles, ~e 
repositories for personal effects. Moreo~rT~~bQ c~~ ·s 
safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the 
additional and greater intrusion of a search without a 
warrant." Id., at 601. See United States v~ · Chadwick, 433 
fn 2. 
4. The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that, 
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 
5. The need for a carefully drawn, limited warrant for 
searches of private premises was the product in large part of 
~h:..· (~ 1- * 
the colonists' sieeaei~fact±on wieh the writs of assistance to 
which they were subjected by the English. See United · States · v; 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977); J. Landynski, Search and 
Seizure and the Supreme Court 19 (1966); N. Lasson, The History 
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 51-78 (1937). Mr. Justice Frankfurter went so far 
as to suggest that abuses of the writs of assistance were "so 
deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes 
of the Revolution." United States v~ Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 
69 (1950)(dissenting opinion). is understandable, 
t erefore, that the Framers wished to make prior 
a check on the kind of arbitrary exercise 
6. Jones · v. United States, 357 u.s. 493, 499 (1958). 
~ v-1~ 
7. Cou~e~ hwillingness Ato excuse the absence of a warrant 




road has led to what maR~ fiaoe called the "automobile 
"' 
exception" to the warrant requirement, although the exception 
does not invariably apply whenever automobiles are searched. 
See, e.g., Coolidge v~ New Hampshire, at 461-62 ("The word 
'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth 
Amendment fades away and disappears.") See generally, Moylan, 
The Automobile Exception: What it is and What it is not--A 
Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 
(1976). 
d.,,._ 
8. ~tate~-A~~ont--e~o~r~r~t~ ~espsndent's s~anding . to 
~ ~+ ""- ~-~.,~ ~~~ 
b(espondenti i..fr 1.-J±s 19~ie'&y $ee Brief for Respondent 3, ~ i:~ii\in ..J 
~~~= ~ ~~=-~~~s~· 
-1-o ~~~~~ . 
t~~~e ~~ ~~~¥· See Simmons v. United · States, 
390 u.s. 377, 387-88 (1968). Cf. Rakas v~ · Illinois, _- _· u.s.~, 
lAC-~ ~ ~ .,a ... .,.L J.1....._ ~ ~ .,.~ o? 
locked footlocker 1\ wbe:rea-e 1:rr 4:~~ --pTeS"e"ilt case= the ~e-1 iee 
~~ 
SQa~eaea g~~ a small, unlocked suitcase. Although the size of 
" 
footlocker in Chadwick made the trunk less mobile, it also 
k··· 
more difficult for ~ police sesYrely to 
~~ 1-+t· ~.,... ~ ~r;;;. --"'(..> ' 
seize A Moreover, respondent's failure to lock his suitcase did 
fn 4. 
~e bag's fundamental character as a 
personal effects. Accordingly, respondent did not ~A iRY ~~~ 
relinquish his natural expectation of privacy associated with 
the suitcase. See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz 
Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 154, 170 (1977). 
At the same time, however, we recognize that there may be some 
containers seized by police, either within or without an 
automobile, for which an owner could not have surrounded by a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
10. There may be cases in which the special exigencies of the 
situation would justify the warrantless search of a suitcase. 
Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)(police had reason 
to suspect automobile trunk contained a weapon). Generally, 
however, such exigencies will depend upon the contents of the 
luggage and the suspect's access to those contents--not upon 
whether the suitcase is taken from an automobile. Moreover, in 
the present case the State has conceded that there were no 
special exigencies. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16. 
Nor do we consider the constitutionality of searches of 
luggage incident to the arrest of its possessor. See, e.g., 
United · States · v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The State has 
not argued that respondent's suitcase was searched incident to 
his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not within his 
fn 5. 
"immediate control" at the time of the search. 
11. The difficulties is seizing and securing automobiles have 
led the Court to make special allowances for their search. See 
note 13, infra. 
-------12. Tss"Q --i-s...~ ~e-ot~~ but that !he pol ice easily could have 
obtained a search warrant if they had taken the suitcase to a 
magistrate. They had probable cause to believe not only that 
respondent was carrying marihuana, but also that the contraband 
was contained in the suitcase that they seized. 
13. Were we to accept the State's suggestion and extend the , 
automobile search exception to luggage taken from automobiles 
stopped on the street, it would have "the perverse result of 
allowing fortuitous circumstances to control" the 
constitutionality of such a search. United States v. Chadwick, ( 
SUP.ra, at 22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, under our 
r ? 
in Chadwick, the police could not have searched the I 
"""' suitcase without a warrant immediately before respondent's tax· 
left the curb at the airport. We see no reason why the need 
for a warrant evaporated merely because the vehicle drove a 
short distance before it was stopped and the police seized the 
suitcase. 
Nor are we persuaded by the State's argument that, under 
Chambers i1;Jrft<.?"\¥.-" ~9 lJ .S./ 42 ( 1976), if the police were 
fn 6. 
entitled to seize the suitcase, then they were entitled to 
search it~nstead In Chambers, the Court upheld the 
warrantless search of an automobile stopped on the highway by 
police who believed that its occupants had robbed a gasoline 
station a short time before. The Court recognized that 
"[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's 
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be 
permitted until a search warrant is obtained •••• " Id., at 51. 
Nonetheless, the Court ruled that a warrantless search was 
permissible, as there was no constitutional difference between 
the intrusion of seizing and holding the automobile until a 
warrant could be obtained, on the one hand, and searching the 
vehicle without a warrant, on the other. 
W-L-~ 
GoRt~~He ~~astio&-o£ ~e ~e, however, the 
seizure ofA suitcasef A~ quite different from the seizure of ~ 
...., 
automobile; . In Chambers, if the Court had required the 
a.•c~L ~~•1 ~J;<~c,k 1 
"lesser" intrusion of seizure~ it would have imposed a 
constitutional requirement upon police departments of all sizes 
around the country to have available the people and equipment 
-~~~..,_~ h~··~e,L__. 
necessary to transport impounded automobiles to some central 
(\ 
$ 
location until l warran \ could be secured. Moreover, once 
seized automobiles were taken from the highway the police would 
~
be responsible for providing some ~A location where they 
} ~d-. ._,.-~- "' fl-.~~ lfc.-~·¥' s.·~ 
could be keptl until a magistrate ruled on the application for a 
~~JJ-4,_,_ 
warrant. Such a constitutional requirement wontd impose~ 
J\ 
~ ~-~~~~.~ .. ~~~~A, ?c4tr:.'---l-
s~Q.st.c3:R-tiai ~sts and impositien!!l' on many police departments, 
see Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 
in 
See South · Dakota · v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 
364, 379 (Powell, J., concurring); Note, Warrantless Searches 
difficulty: Suitcases 
the present case can be seized and 
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\~'\ 
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found our 
decision in Chadwick virtually controlling in this case.* 
The state contends, however, that Chadwick does not control 
because the vehicle in question had remained parked at the 
curb where the footlocker had been placed in its trunk and 
that therefore no argument was made - and indeed could not 
have been made - that the automobile search exception was 
applicable. It is true that this Court has not had occasion 
previously to rule on the constitutionality of a warrantless 
search of luggage taken from an automobile that had been 
lawfully stopped under circumstances in which the automobile 
exception normally would be applicable. Rather, the 
decisions to date have involved searches of some integral 
part of the automobile. 
l)\ 
./ MThe facts of the two cases are similar in several 
critical respects. In Chadwick, a locked 200-pound 
footlocker had been placed 1n the trunk of an automobile at 
the time it was seized by police upon probable cause, but 
searched without a warrant. In the present case, 
respondent's comparatively small, unlocked suitcase also had 
been placed in the trunk of an automobile, and after the 
vehicle had driven off, it was stopped lawfully and the 
suitcase seized on probable cause and searched without a 
warrant. We do not view the difference in size of the 
footlocker and suitcase as being material here, nor did 
respondent's failure to lock his suticase alter its 
fundamental character as a repository for personal, private 
effects. 
-
LFP/lab 3/26/79 Rider A, pg. Arkansas v~ Saunders 
17-1'1-'?7 
Note · to · David: 
We took this case to clarify the meaning of 
Chadwick. On its facts, this presents an easy case. The 
article in question is personal luggage - a suitcase of the 
type traditionally used to transport personal belongings 
with respect to which one has a high degree of expectation 
of privacy. 
I 
But as Justice Blackmun's dissent from denial of 
cert indicates (9/27/78), the difficulty will be in 
determining what type of "container" found in an automobile 
lawfully stopped, and believed to contain a controlled 
substance, or other contraband, is to be treated like 
luggage? We know from our own experience that people 
transport almost every conceivable kind of object, packaqe, 
box and container in automobiles, and particularly in the 
type of vans that now are so popular. 
It is necessary for us to add a footnote 
addressing this problem. I would appreciate it if you and 
Paul undertook a draft. We certainly should not undertake 
to render advisory opinions as to the types of packages or 
containers that come within the "luggage" rule. Perhaps all 
we can do is recognize that serious linedrawing problems 
will exist, and that courts simply will have to apply the 
principles we have established. The more obvious ones 
include the "plain view" doctrine. Under prior cases, the 
automobile search exception allows police to look into the 
trunk, glove compartment, under the carpet, etc. Whatever 
is found in "plain view" may be seized. With respect to the 
more difficult question of packages, parcels, containers and 
the like that require opening before the contents can be 
known for sure, the only principle that comes to mind at the 
moment is w,hether there is a reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to the particular item. If, for 
example, there is a container - say, a tool kit - that 
customarily is used for burglary equipment, there would be 
no expectation of privacy. Nor, if a gun were found in 
searching the automobile, a box in the trunk that reasonably 
might contain ammunition probably could be seized and 
examined on the spot. 
I suppose there is little expectation of privacy 
with respect to packages wrapped at a store and being 
transported, say, to one's residence. There would be only a 
limited privacy interest in something one had purchased, and 
had it wrapped by the salesman, for the purpose of 
transporting it horne. But it would be quite difficult for 
police, on the spot, to make judgments of this type. 
I suppose that in most situations, consent to 
search would be obtained rather than have the automobile and 
all of its contents impounded. But whereever narcotics or 
2. 
contraband materials are within packages in an automobile 
trunk, I suppose our holding in Saunders will require - at 
least in most instances - that the warrant clause be 
applied. 
I hope you can come up with some artful writing. 
3. 




21 It was argued by the state that, in these 
circumstances, it merely inconvenienced all concerned -
including respondent - to defer searching the suitcase until 
it could be carried to a stationhouse and a warrant 
obtained. If respondent had in fact objected on the grounds 
of this type of "inconvenience", he could have avoided it by 
consenting to the search. 
LFP/lab 3/26/79 Rider A , pg • 1 1 Arkansas · v~ Saunders 
I 
We therefore find no justification for the extension of 
Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search of ones 
personal luggage merely because it was located in an 
automobile lawfully stopped by the police. lll 
... 
LFP/lab 3/26/79 Rider A, pg. 4 Arkansas · v. Saunders 
Note to David: 
Part II of the draft launches immediately into a 
summary of familiar Fourth Amendment principles. This may 
be the best way to commence Part II. But, as Justice White 
pointed out at our Conference (see my notes), and also see 
his dissertt from denial of cert, we are "drawing lines" in 
these Fourth Amendment cases, often with little "principle" 
supporting the distinction. Moreover, prior to Chadwick, I 
believe the lower courts uniformly extended the automobile 
execption to include the contents of luggage found within an 
automobile properly stopped. 
In view of these considerations, perhaps a 
preliminary paragraph or two might be appropriate - to be 
added on page 4 of the draft. The dictation that follows is 
merely one possible mode of introduction - and one that I 
have had no opportunity to "polish". It may, however, give 
you some idea as to a more artful introduction. You and 
Paul should feel free to suggest alternatives or to 
recommend that we add nothing as a preference to the 
discussion of the familiar principles in Part II. 
* * * * 
II 
The reports of this Court are replete with 
decision in which we have been asked to vindicate Fourth 
Amendment rights. The relevant principles have been stated 
time and again. Yet, claims of entitlement to suppress 
highly relevant evidence continue to occupy the attention of 
federal and state courts at all levels. The difficulty is 
that factual variations seems almost infinite, and often it 
is difficult for law enforcement and for the courts to know 
whether a particular variation brings the case within or 
without the protection of the amendment. This, at least on 
the surface, is such a case. 
Only two Terms ago, in Chadwick, we held that a 
locked footlocker, seized on probable cause after loaded 
into the trunk of a motor vehicle, but prior to its being 
driven away, could not properly be searched without a 
warrant. In earlier cases (Chambers and Carroll), under 
what has become known as the automobile exception to the 
warrant clause, the Court has sustained the validity of 
warrantless searches of automobile and their contents upon a 
showing of probable cause. This case, arguably, could be 
controlled either by Chadwick or by the Chambers/Carroll 
line of precedence. We thus are presented with the familiar 
2. 
necessity of linedrawing in a Fourth Amendment case. We 
believe, upon careful analysis, this can be done on a 
principled basis. 







Arkansas ~- Saunders 
I return herewith the first draft of 3/21/79, as 
edited by Paul, of my opinion in this case. 
As you will note, I have subjected it to rather 
extensive editing - perhaps the reflexive response of being 
too weak to edit with greater care and finesse. 
The same may be said about the riders I have 
dictated on a couple of taps that should be given to Sally 
first thing Monday morning. 
I think we have the substance of a sound opinion, 
and hope we can move it forward to a first opinion draft by 
the end of this week. 
To: The Chi8f Ju&t 
Mr. Justice Br• n'i~'' 
!tr. Just tee Stewnrt 
M.r. Just toe White 
Ur. Juntloe l!3.reball 
Mr . Justice Blaokmun 
l;lr. Justice Powell 
1st DRAFT 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From : lr. Justice Stevens 
1ft 12 79 
O:l.roulatedt -------
Reo1roulated: _______ __ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-1497 
n Writ of Certiorari to the 
State of Arkansas, Petitioner, l 
0 
Lo 
. J v. S d Supreme Court of Arkansas. 
mue ames an ers. 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment. 
Having improvidently granted certiorari. the Court now 
improvidently decides a question that is not presented by this 
case. 
The question that is presented by the State's certiorari peti-
tion is frivolous. Because the police had probable cause to 
believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana 
before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab. their duty to 
obtain a warrant before opening it was clear. United States 
v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1. The State's attempt to distinguish 
Chadwick is properly rejected by the Court in a footnote. See 
n. 9, ante. 
The question the Court chooses to decide is quite different 
from the one presented by petitioner: whether a warrant is 
necessary before opening luggage when the police have prob-
able cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in a 
vehicle, but when they do not know ·whether, for example, it 
is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk. in the glove com-
partment. or concealed in some part of the car's structure. I 
am not sure whether that would be a stronger or weaker case 
for requiring a warrant before the luggage is opened. but T am 
sure that it would be better for the Court to have thC' question 
argued before deciding it. 
Rather than joining the Court's advisory opinion. 1 concur 
in its judgment for the reasons stated by the Supreme Court 
of Arkansas, 
'3~h~ -.pOW'-l\~ ..L nt.V- If'<)+ WV'~ liN ';) T~k ~ 
>" ~at T cq>~lG\ ~ \ov --hv- ~~~ ~l-W.b.N .. Dra.f+ 
(aj-+- ~. 'J" \A.~ ~ '"' -h.- W\~"' \-wb -y\7 . ..._.., 
t.J-.1~ ~,~ c~~ ~Ov'- buM ""-wl..&..,, ~ r 'let-N '\~"k. 
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State of Arkansas, Petitioner, .J 
v. On Writ of Certiorari to the _.~ ~ _ .1-.l 
Supreme Court of Arkansas. ~~--- · 
Lonnie James Sanders. (9-1-~u-
[April-, 1979] ~ -hrv 1~ 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of tbe Court. ~ ~~ j) 
This case presents the questi<;m whether, in the absence of J ~ ... #. ;_;-
exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant L--t.. ~ MI. 
before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly ~ • L d 
stopped and searched for contraband. We took this case by ~r-- 1 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve ki ~ 
some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our 
decision in .United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), to 
-warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.1 
I 
On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock, 
Ark., Police Department received word from an informant 
that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an 0 
American Airlines flight at gate number one f. the Municipal 
Airport of Little Rock, Ark. According to the informant, 
respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing 
marihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent 
well, as in January of 1976 the informant had given the Little 
Rock Police Department information that had led to re-
spondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana. 
1 Compare United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 641-642 (CA9 
1977), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F. 2d 1175, 1178-1179 (CAS 1978) 
(en bane). 
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Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers 
placed the a.irport under surveillance. As the informant had 
predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate one. The police 
watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a 
waiting taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met 
a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo. 
While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline 
baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by 
the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his com-
panion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which 
he had put his luggage. Rambo waited a short while in the 
a~rport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing · 
the green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle. 
,When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent, 
Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow 
officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car, stopped 
the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of 
the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle, 
where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking 
the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police 
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to 
be 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags. 
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged 
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in viola .. 
tion of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-2617 ( 1976). 2 Before trial, 
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under 
·the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court 
held a hearing on January 31, 1977, and denied the suppres-
sion motion without explanation. After respondent's convic-
2 In addition to the marihuana found in the suitcase, police officers 
found one ounce of hrroin hidden in their patrol car after transporting 
Rambo to police headquarters. Accordingly, Rambo also was charged 
with possc:osion of heroin with intent to deliver. Immediately before trial 
on both counts, the court severed the heroin possession count for later 
trial. 
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tion by a jury on February 3, 1977, he was sentenced to 10 
years in prison and was fined $15,000. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed respond-
ent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have 
suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through 
-- ---- 'f '1'1' c;Pitrase. 262 Ark. 595, 559 S. W. 
of impracticality in obtaHllH!; "' ~- -
at 600, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706.3 
II 
Despite our repeated attempts to set forth the basic princi 
ples applicable to claims of Fourth Amendment violations, 
requ r the su J ression of hi hi relevant evidenc 
ti u to occupy much of the attention o courts at all levels of 
the state and federal judiciary. ~ _g,ourts and law enforce-
a "With the suitcase safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to under-
take the additional and gr<'ater intn1sion of a searrh without a warrant." 
262 Ark. 595, 601, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 707. The court also rejected the 
State's rontC'ntion that luggag<' is entitled to a lesser protection against 
warrantless searches than are other private areas, surh as homes. It noted 
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ment official~ifficult to scern 1e proper application 
of g.eflEWal.Jffiu~dmeni rinciples to individual cases~ 
because the circumstances giving rise to suppression requests 
can vary almos~ infinitely] . and ilm~ .SiffQten~s. jD:' factYa! 
rr ' 
'FM :pt'Q86.Ut, sase--ill.us~~ ~ diffieult,is.g. Only 
two Terms ago, we held that a locked footlocker could not 
lawfully be searched without a warrant, even though it had 
been loaded into the trunk of an automobile parked at a curb. 
United States v. Chadwick, supra. In earlier cases, on the 
other hand, the Court sustained the constitutionality of war-
rantless searches of automobiles and their contents under what 
has become known as the "automobile exceptio ' ee. e. g., 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v . . United 
tates, . S. 132 ( 1925). ¥'determining whether the war-
rantless search of respondent's suitcase falls on the Chadwick 
or the Chambers/Carroll side of the Fourth Amendment lin •·----·, . . g 
demar ing the scope of individuals' pFirae.y:(' Although this~ ---,. 
line must be drawn meticulously, we believe it to be based ~,_, C..CT'MlM!:;'lc.4.. 0 f I . . ,~. h 0.. SIJM 
~ ~{111\~lp ~Q ~ 
'Fft.~-llSraig teBets &J:Q 44uni*Rr. The Fourth Amendment j A"~ ~.J~- ­
protec~.inat-viGI~s' privacy and security ..(in two important C.-, ,_, ----
ways. First, it guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be - --------
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." In addition, this Court 
has interpreted the amendment to wlude the requirement that 1\ 
normally searches of private property be performed pursuant 
to a seach warrant issued in compliance with the warrant 
clause.4 See, e. g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390 
(1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 9 (1977); 
4 The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment providPs that, "no War- ' 
rants shall 'issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describin the lace to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized." ~~...-...-c ... ~ 
4 1-kt.- /)...~ ~ ~ ~~~~_..,.r-:( 
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United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297, 
317 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); 
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 (1925). In the 
ordinary case, therefore, a search of private property must be 
both reasonable and performed pursuant to a properly issued 
~h warrant. The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed 
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a sub-
stitute for the judicial warrant required under the Fourth 
Amendment. See United States v. United States District 
Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971), 
"[t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our 
constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the 
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this 
country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 
'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or 
should be, an important working part of our machinery of 
government, operating as a matter of course to check the 
'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive 
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement." 
The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our 
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that indi-
vidual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation 
of powers and division of functions among the different 
branches and levels of government." United States v. United 
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that con-
clusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search 
"be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) , we minimize the risk of unreasonable 
assertions of executive authority. See McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451,455-456 (1948).5 
5 The need for a carefully drawn, limited warrant for searches of private 
premises was the product in large part of the colonists' resentment of the 
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Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. These have been established where it was con-
cluded that the public interest required some flexibility in the 
application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a 
prerequisite for a search. See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). Thus, a few "jealously and 
careful1y drawn" 6 exceptions provide for those cases where the 
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law 
officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh 
the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistate. See 
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 318. 
But because each exception to tho warrant requirement in-
variably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search 
may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been 
carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the 
exemption to show the need for it." ·United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951). See Chirnel v. ·California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762 (1969); Katz v. United States, supra, at 357. More-~ 
over, we have limited the reach of ~exception to that whic~ 
is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society. 
See Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 393; United States v. Chad-
wick, supra, at 15 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 
at 455. 
One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not 
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile 
on the street or highway because they have probable cause to 
writs of ass:stance to which they were subjected by the English. See 
United States v. Chadwirlc, 433 U. S. 1, 8 (1977); J . Landynski, Search 
and ScizurP and the Supreme Court 19 (1966); N. Lasson, The History 
and Development of the Fourth AmPnclment to the United States Con-
stitution 51-78 ( 1937). Mr. Justice Frankfurter went so far as to sug-
gest that abuses of the writs of assistance were "so deeply felt by the 
Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution." United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 69 (1950) (eli ·senting opinion). 
6 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958). 
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believe it contains contraband ;9r7 evidence of a crime/\\ See ~0 . 
.United States v. Martinez-F'uerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561-562 ......--
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 (1975); 
Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 68 (1975). As the Court said 
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925), 
"the guaranty of frredom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, 
practically since the beginning of the Government, as 
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a 
store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of 
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, 
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile1 
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure 
a warrant .... " 7 
There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between 
automobiles and other private property. First, as the Court 
repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automo-
biles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See, 
e. g., United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12; Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U. S., 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 
, 
------_,'<!'"-_ ___.:su~~r..::::a:.:..· ~I;n:._::addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of ~ 
~1..~. J. .J/~~ automobiles e the ran~aBitsJ expec~a 10n o privacy that L 
often exists with respect to ai:fferently swated property. See" 
Rakas v. Illinois,- U. S. -,- (1978) (PowELL, J., con-
curring); United States v. Chadwick, supra; South Dakota v. 
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976). 
7 The willingness of courts to excuse the absence of a warrant where 
spontaneous searches are required of a vehicle on the road has led to what 
is called the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirem0nt, although 
the exception does not invariabl~r apply whenever automobiles are sear:ched 
Sec, e. g., Coolidge v. New Ilampshire, ~ 461-462-0"The wo;d 'm~mobilc' 
is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away 
and disappears."). See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception: 
What it is and What it is not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 
27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976). 
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III 
In the present case, the State argues that the warrantless 
search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and 
its progeny.8 The police acted properly-indeed commend-
ably-in apprehending respondent and his luggage. They 
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green 
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant 
had provided a detailed account of respondent's expected 
arrival at the Little Rock Aiport, which account proved to be 
accurate in every detail, including the color of the suitcase in 
which respondent would be carrying the marihuana. Having 
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven 
away in the taxi, the police were justified in stopping the 
vehicle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the suitcase they 
suspected contained contraband. See Chambers v. Maroney, 
supra, at 52. At oral argument respondent conceded that the 
stop of the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitu-
tionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 30, 44- 46. 
The only question, therefore, is whether the police, rather 
than immediately searching the suitcase without a warrant, 
should have taken it to the police station with respondent 
and obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of 
luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a war-
rant. In Chadwick we declined an invitation to extend the 
'Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting that neither 
of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers 
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their 
control at the time of the search. Consequently, "there was 
not the slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents 
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could 
8 Respondent concedes that the suitcase was his property, see Brief for 
Respondent 3, and so there is no question of his standing to rhallrnge the 
search. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 387- 388 (1968). 
Cf. Rakas v. Illinois,- U.S.-,- (1978). 
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be obtained." 433 U. S., at 13. And, as we observed in that 
case, luggage, unlike automobiles, is a common repository for 
one's personal effects, and therefore is associated with an 
expectation of privacy largely absent with respect to auto-
mobiles. Ibid. ~~ 
The State argues, r, that the warrantless search o 
respondent's suitcase was proper, not because the property 
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an 
3Jutomobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street. In 
effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow war-
rantless searches of everything found within an automobile, 
as well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas found our decision in Chadwick virtually 
controlling in this case.0 'l'he State contends, however, that 
dhadwick does not control because in that case the vehicle had 
remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been 
placed in its trunk and that therefore no argument was made 
that the automobile search exception was applicable. This 
Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitu-
tionality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from an 
automobile lawfully stoppec~.mdeP eiPeM!'RB*t:tHces in which bhe ( 
automobile exception nGrmaUy w:ouhl be a;ppli6aWe/ Rather, 
the decisions to date have involved searches of some integral 
part of the automobile. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 U. S. 364, 366 (1976) (glove compartment); Texas v. 
0 The facts of the two cases are similar in several critical respects. In 
Chadwick, a locked, 200-pound footlocker was searched without a warrant 
after the police, acting with probable cause, had taken it from the trunk 
1----;o~" automobile. In the present case, respondent's comparatively small, 
unlocked suitcase also had been placed in the trunk of an automobile and 
was searched without a warrant by police acting upon probable cause. We 
do not view the difference in the sizes of the footlocker and suitcase as 
material here; nor did respondent's failure to lock his suitcase alter its 
fundamental character as a repository for personal, private effects. Cf. 
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 
Mich. L. Rev. 154, 170 (1977). 
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White, 423 U. S. 67. 68 (1975) (passenger compartment); 
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 437 (1973) (trunk); 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 44 (1970) (concealed 
compartment under the dashboard); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S., at 136 (behind the upholstering of the scats). 
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of 
demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage 
properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the 
trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in 
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of 
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the 
search-after the police have seized the object to be searched 
and have it securely within their controP0 See 433 U. S., at 
i3. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did ·here, the 
extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from 
which it was ta'ken. 11 Accordingly, as a general rule there is 
no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from 
automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.12 
10 The difficulties is seizing and securing automobiles have led the Court 
to make special allowances for their search. Seen. 14, infra. 
11 There may be cases in which t'he special exigencies of the situation 
would justify the warrantless search of a suitcase. Cf. Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973) (police had reason to suspect automobile trunk 
contained a weapon). Generally, however, such exigencies will depend 
upon t e contents of . the luggage and the suspect's access to those con- . 
tents-not upon whether the · s a en rom an au ·omo 1 e. ~
~ 6·• ~T! ,W the present case the State has concecled that there were no special 
exigencies. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16. 
Nor do we cons:der t hr constitutionality of searches of luggage incident 
to the arrest of its pos~essor. See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 414 
U. S. 218 (1973). The State has not argued that respondent's suitcase 
was searched incident to his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not 
within his "immediate control" at the tjme ofJ'he=iear.ph 
• 1$;he pohce easily could have obtained a search warrant if they had 
tnklin the suitcase to a magiRtrate. They had probablr cause io believe 
not only that respondent was carrying marihuana, but also that 1he con-
traband was contained in the suitcase that they seized. The State argues 
·that under the clrcumst:mces of this case inconvenience to all concerned 
W \-\lNe.- r"~c..o~r~.at ~t r~C,.O'"Y\'tl f~~-~ ~~~t lVI~ 
Cow.trf 't(\'1 be,. ~~\\u\ a-\ ~ ~ ~ c..fC::~~~ 
~1>+- wO\JlcA ~ o~r·~ j0.,~~ ~ . ~~~ ~. <;uJ k'V~·~ ,s~~ 
\14 ~ ) ~~ \ u. ~I tt>.~ J ~tb Ll~11). A(~'2.1> Ji>eh ~t 2-\~ 
-n.. .. +- tkL ~"~ of ~f~~ ·) \v))'"\&.. ~~ h a ~orJ..w 
SWc.~, 
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Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on 
the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expecta-
tion of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from 
other locations. One is not less inclined to place priva.te, 
personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase 
is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by 
other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the· 
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for 
personal items when one wishes to transport them.1 3 Accord-
ingly, the reasons for not requiring a warrant for the search of 
an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage 
taken by police from automobiles. We therefore find no 
justification for the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the 
warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it 
was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.14 
would have been thr only result of deferring search of the suitcase until a 
warrant was obtained. Those in respondent's position who find such in-
convenience unacceptable, 9£ Q8l!IW'\ ~'S may avoid it y consenting to 
the search. 
13 Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of 
a search will dE'serve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, 
some containers (for, example gun casef) by their very nature cannot 
support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can 
be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the 
contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the 
need for a warrant. See Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236 
(1968) (p er curiam). There will be difficulties in determining which par-
cel taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and 
which do not. Our drcision in this case means only that a warrant en-
erally is required before personal luggage can be searche that the extent 
~ to which the Fourth Amendment appli es to other parce s epen s not at 
a UJ)On w 1et er t>4.e ~ are seized from an automobile. 
r \)J j;(l!, ~ot r-- l~~P~@ persuadE'd by the State's argument that, under Chamber ' 
~ ~ -~ if the police were pntitled to seize thr suitcase, then they were entitlrd to 
se:nrh it. In Chambers, the Court uphrld the warrantless search of an 
automobile stopped on the highway by police who believed that its occu-
pants had robbed a gnsoline station a short time before. The Court rec-
ognized that "[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's 
v. /V1at~'I'\.C.1 ) ~~~ u. ~. 
4 -z. 091o) 
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In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an auto-
mobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other 
locations. Thus, insofar as the police are entitled to search 
such luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified 
under some exception to the warrant requirement other than 
that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway. 
Where-as in the present case-the police, without endanger-
ing themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have 
detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his 
suitcase, they should delay the sea.rch thereof until after judi- / 
cial approva~ been obtained. In this way, tffiS}'leets' 6 - -----
constitutional i.ntQrssts m pnor JU 1c1a rev1ew o searc es w1 ~J:.ti, ~ 
be fully served. 
The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is 
Affirmed. 
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a 
search warrant is obtained .. .. " !d., at 51. Nonetheless, the Court 
ruled that a warrantle~s search was permi~sible, there was no constitu-
tional difference between the intrusion of seizing and holding the automo-
bile until a warrant could be obtained, on the one hand, and searching the 
vehicle without a warrant, on the other. 
We view, however, the seizure of a suitcase as quite different from the 
seizure of an automobile. In ChambeTs, if the Court had required 4e--f 
~~seizure and holding of the vehicle, it would have 
imposed a constitutional requirement upon police departments of all siz·es 
around the country to have available the people and equipment necessary ( 
., to transport impounded automobiles 1'!~HrBeFiRg Benretimee -in the htlii! 
aFeelw...,to soma central location until warrants could be secured. More-
over, once seized automobiles were taken from the highway the police 
would be responsible for providing some appropriate location where they 
could be kept, with due regard to the safety of the vehicles and their 
contents, until a magistrate ruled on the application for a warrant. Such 
a constitutional requirement therefore would have imposed severe)~ 
~eas even impossibl~ burdens~n many police departments. See Note, 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 
841-842 ( 197 4). No comparable burdens are likely to exist with respect 
to the seizure of personal luggage. 
jt), ( L 0 U 1\ J~l TV 
Qy_;fal" wh~ 4ere W/J 
no (f?5f0nJe fo C/erl<5 






fw{) CFI2_ /e-t-fer-5, 
Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel 
(Resp's motion to proceed if£ is on p. 21 of this 
Conference.) 
Jack T. Lassiter, Esq., seeks to be appointed to represent 
resp. His law partner, William McArthur, represented resp at 
trial and on appeal, and filed the if£ motion. Mr. Lassiter 
was admitted to practice-fn Ark. in 1973, and to the bar of 
this Court in June 1978. He has argued a number of cases 
before CA 8. 
Jr-ee 
- 2 -
Although Mr. Lassiter appears qualified, because of 
apparent neglect by his firm when the Court requested a 
response to the cert petn, I am not sure he should be 
appointed. On June 6, the Clerk wrote to Mr. Arthur requesting 
a response by July 6. On July 13, the Clerk again wrote asking 
why no respnse had been filed. The Clerk advises that he 
received no response to this letter either. It was only after 
the Court granted cert, that the attorneys contacted the 
Court. Although Mr. Lassiter has already filed his brief on 
the merits (typewritten), I would not appoint him until he has 
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Motion of resp for leave 
to proceed further herein 
ifp. 
Cert was granted on October 10. Although requested, resp 
apparently did not file a response. See Oct. 2, 1978 Con£., p. 8. 
Through counsel in the court below, who does not know resp's 
present whereabouts or financial condition, resp asks to proceed 
ifp. He was so permitted by the Ark. SC, and counsel attaches 
resp's June 1978 affidavit which states that since his release from 
prison he has had no substantial employment and that he has no 
money or property , except an interest in the home awarded to his 
former wife in their divorce. 
This is a criminal case, and resp apparently was in prison for 
some time. In view of the finding of indigency below, updated at 
least to June 1978, it would seem that this motion should be granted. 
12/19/78 Richman 
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I believe we took this case because it appeared 
that the Arkansas Supreme Court had unduly extended 
Chadwick. 
Police had probable cause (based on a reliable 
informer's information) to believe that respondent was 
bringing narcotics into the Little Rock airport. The 
suitcase containing the drugs was described by the 
informant. Police "tailed" respondent upon his arrival, and 
when the suitcase was placed in a cab that drove away, the 
cab was stopped and searched. The suitcase, unlocked, was --found in the trunk of the car, and thereupon it was 
searched. It did in fact contain narcotics. 
Although it was conceded that there was probable 
cause to stop the automobile and perhaps to search open and 
visible areas thereof, the Arkansas Supreme Court -
purporting to apply Chadwick, held that the police had no 
right to open the unlocked suitcase. They should have 




In a rather intemperate brief, ~he attorney 
general of Arkansas argues that the "automobile exception" 
to the warrant requirement applies. He contends that there 
The case is difficult because of the conflict 
between the practicalities and legal theory. Once the car 
was stopped, pursuant to probable cause based on it being 
the vehicle in which the suitcase was being transported, it 
is clear that at least the police would have been justified 
in detaining the car and suitcase until they coulq obtain a 
warrant. Alternatively, they could have taken the suitcase 
to headquarters and not opened it until they had obtained a 
warrant. In the circumstances of this case, it was a 
certainty that a warrant would issue. Therefore, it can b~ 
argued that it is irrational to suppress the critical 
:r 
evidence merely because the police did not follow the rule 
book when the result would have been the same in any event. 
Nor was the privacy of respondent invaded any more by 
opening the suitcase at the scene of the stop than it would 
have been at headquarters after a warrant had been obtained. 
So much for the practical aspects of the case. 
the theoretical side, if it is conceded that the suitcase 
could have been seized and taken to headquarters for the 
purpose of obtaining a warrant, there no "exigent 




Thus, the case could be written along these 
A brief, summary bench memo would be welcome, but 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77- 1497 
On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
State of Arkansas, Petitioner, I 
v. Supreme Court of Arkansas. 
Lonnie James Sanders. 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. JusncE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether, in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant 
before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly 
stoppeJ and searched for contraband. We took this case by 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve 
some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our 
decision in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), to 
warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.1 
I 
On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock, 
Ark .. Police Department received word from an informant 
that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an 
American Airlmes flight at gate number one of the Municipal 
Airport of Little Rock. Ark. According to the informant. 
respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing 
marihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent 
well . as in January of 1976 the informant had given the Little 
Rock Police Department information that had led to re-
spondent's arrest and conviction for possessioH of marihuana. 
1 Compare Umted States v. fi'mnegan. 56R F . 2d 6:37, 641-642 (CA9 
1977) , w1th United State~J v. Stevie . 5R2 F. 2d 1175, 1178-1179 (CAS 1978) 
(en bane ) 
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.Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other policP officers 
placed the airport under surveillance. As the informant had 
predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate one. The police 
watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a 
waiting taxicab, retumed to the baggage claim area, and met 
a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo. 
While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline 
baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by 
the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his com-
panion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which 
he had put his luggage. Rambo waited a short while in the 
airport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing 
tlw green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle. 
When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent, 
Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow 
officers gave pursuit and. with the help of a patrol car, stopped 
the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of 
the police. the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle, 
where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking 
the permission of either respondent or Rambo. the police 
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to 
bP 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags. 
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged 
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in viola-
tion of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-2617 (1976). 2 Before trial, 
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under 
the l<'""om·th and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court 
held a hearing on January 31, 1977, and denied the suppres-
sion motion without explanation. After respondent's convic-
~ In addition to thr marihttllllll found in the ~tt!lca~e, policr officers 
l'uuud one ounce of heroin hidden in their patrol car after tran~porting 
Rambo to police headquarters. Accordingly, Hambo abo wa~ charged 
with pos;:;es~ion of hrroin with int!:'nt to deliver. lmmrdiately beforr trial 
ou both counts, the court srvercd_ the lwroin I?O&ir~ion count, fill'· later.· 
tri!ll . 
77-1497-0PINION 
ARKANSAS v. SANDERS 3 
tion by a jury on February 3, 1977, he was sentenced to 10 
years in prison and was fined $15,000. 
On appeal the Supreme Court o.f Arkansas reversed respond-
ent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have 
suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through 
an unlawful search of the suitcase. 262 Ark. 595. 559 S. W. 
2d 704 (1977). Relying upon United Stntes v. Chadwick, 
supra, and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), 
the court concluded that a warrantless search generally must 
be supported by "probable cause coupled with exigent circum-
stances." 262 Ark., at 599. 559 S. W. 2d, a.t 706. In the 
present case, the court found there was ample probable cause 
for the police officers' belief that contraband was contained in 
the ~uitcase they searched. The court found to be wholly 
lacking, however, any exigent circumstance justifying the 
officers' failure to secure a warrant for the search of the lug-
gage. With the police in control of the automobile and its 
occupants, there was no danger that the suitcase and its 
contents would be rendered unavailable to due legal process. 
The court concluded. therefore, that there was "nothing in this· 
set of circumstances that would lend credence to an assertion 
of impracticality in obtaining a search wat·rant." 262 Ark., 
at 600, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706.3 
II 
Although the general principles applicable to claims of 
Fourth Amendment violations are well settled. litigatiou over· 
requests for suppression of highly relevant evideuce continues 
to occupy much of the attention of courts at all levels of the· 
st9.te and federal judiciary. Courts and law enforcement 
3 " With the suitcHsf' safrly immobilized, it was unreasonable to under-
take the additional and greater intrwsion of a search without a warrant."· 
26.2 Ark . 595, 601, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 707. The court also rejected the 
StatP's contention that luggage is entitled to a le:,:~;er protection against 
warrantle~SlS searclw:; than are other private area,;, ~uch as homes. It noted' 
that suitcases, unlike aut omouil~, customarily ane bbe tepositories for per-
~l'I!HD e.OCecl!s. 
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officials often fiml it difficult to discern thr proper application 
thesC' principks to individual cases, bf'cause tlH' circumstances 
giving rise to suppression r<'quests can vary almost i1lfinitely. 
Moreover, an apparf'ntly small differNICC' in the factual situa.-
tion frequpntly is vir-vved as a con trolling cliffcrPnce in deter-
mining Fourth Amendment rights. The pn'SC'IIt casC' presents 
an example. Only two Terms ago. we held that a locked foot-
locker could not lawfully be sC'arched without a warrant, even 
though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile 
parked at a curb. l'm:ted States v. Chadtm:ck, supra. In 
earlier cases, 011 the other hand. the Court sustained the con-
stitutionality of warrau tkss srarches of automobiles and 
their contents under what has become known as thr "automo-
bile exception' ' to the warrant requirement. See. e. g., Cham-
bers Y. Maroney, 3n9 ( T. S. 42 ( 1970); Carroll v. United States, 
267 P. S. 132 ( 1025). \YP thus are presentPd with the task 
of determining whether the warrantless search of respondent's 
suitcase falls on the C:hadurick or the Chambers/ Carroll side 
of the Fourth Amendmt>nt line. Although in a sense this is 
a line-drawing process. it must be guided by established 
J ,ri11ciples. 
We conunpnce with a summary of these principles. The 
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security of per-
sous in two important ways. First, it guarantees " [ t] he right 
of the people to bf' secure in their persons. houses, papers, and 
effects. against unrPasonable searches and seizures." Tn addi-
tiou, this Court has intt>rprPted the amendment to include the 
rf'quirement that normally searches of private property be 
performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance 
with tht> warraut Clause.4 See, e. g., Miucey v. Arizona, 437 
1Thc warrant clau8<' of tlw Fourth AmPndmPnt providE>~ that, "no War- ' 
rant,; ~hall i~suE>, but upon probable rattH<', ~upported by Oath or affirma-
lwn, 1llld particularl~r de~cribing the place to bP ~earched and the per:sons 
or thing~ to be seized." The Fourth AmE>tldnwnt haH lw('l1 mndr fully 
applicabl e lo th(' 8tatr·~ hy lhl' Funrt('c·nth Anwnrlm(·nt ~('<' Mapp v~ 
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1T. k. 385. 390 (1978); ['nited States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1, 9 (1977); [~nited States v. United States D·istrict Co·urt, 
407 P. S. 297.317 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967); Ag11ello \·. U nded States, 269 e. S. 20. 33 
(1925). In the ordinary case, therefore. a search of private 
property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to 
a properly issued search warrant. The mere reasonableness 
of a search , assessed in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances. is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required 
under the Fourth Amendment. See [ 'nited States v. United 
States District Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v. 
Ne1r Hampshire, 403 L'. S. 443,481 (H)71), 
" [t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our 
constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the 
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this 
country. It is not an inconvenience to be t~omehow 
'weighed ' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or 
should be. an important working part of our machinery of 
government. operating as a matter of course to check the 
'well-mtentiolled but mistakenly overzealous executive 
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement." 
The promment place the warrant requirement IS given in our 
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that indi-
vidual freedoms will best be preserved through a separatiou 
of powers and division of functions among the different 
branches and levels of government.' ' United States v. United 
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that con-
clusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search 
"be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged m the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime, " Johnso·n v. Un·ited States, 
3:~3 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) , wt:' minimize the risk of unreasonable 
Ohw , :~m lT . S. 64:1 (196]); Wulf v. Colorado. :t3b L S. 25 (HJ49). In 
tJm; opmion we refer to 1 hr Fourth Arnendmrut aH 11 ~o applw~ to thO' 
~'tu 1 P ot A rkan~a:-
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assrrtions of executivr authority. Sre McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948):' 
Nonetheless, there are somr rxceptions to the warrant 
requirrment. These havr been Pstablished wherr it was con-
cluded that the public interrst required some flexibihty in the 
application of thE:' general rule that a valid warrant is a. 
prrrequisite for a search. Sec United States v. Martvnez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543. 555 (1976). Thus, a few "jealously and 
carefully drawn" u excE:'ptious provide for those cases where the 
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law 
offie<'rs OJ' the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh 
the reasons for prior recomse to a neutral mag1state. See 
U 11tted States v. C·nited States D·istrict Court, supra, at 318. 
But because each exception to the warrant requirement in-
variably impmges to some extent on the protective purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment, the few situatious in which a search 
may be conductPd in tiH' absence of a warrant have been 
carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the 
Pxemption to show the need for it.'' United States v. Jeffers, 
342 P. S. 48. 51 (1951). ~ee Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 
752, 762 ( 1969); Katz v. United States, supra, at 357. More-
over. we have limited thP reach of each exception to that which 
is npcessary to accommodate the identified needs of society. 
~ ee Mincey v. Arizona, t,'Upra, at 393; United States v. Chad-
wick, supra, at 1.5 (1977) ; Coolidye v. Xew Hampshire, supra, 
at 455 
; The IH:'l>d for a carrfull~· drawn, limitt>d warrant for ~earehP,.; of private 
pr<•mi::;es wa~ th<:> product Ill largr part of the eolonist~' reHentmrnt of the 
writ~ of a~~i;;htn<'<' to whieh tll('y wc·re ~11hjeetPd by the Engl i~h. Se~ 
Uwtf'd States v. Chculu•icl.·. 4:3:~ U. S. 1, g (1977); .r. Landyn~ki. Searclt 
und Seiz11n• and tlw Suprrnw Comt 19 (l91i6) ; N. La~~un. Tlw History 
nnd Dc•velopm<:>nt of the Fomth AmPndmml to tlw l ' nitPd StatP~ Con-
~tltllfton 51-iR (19:{7). :\fr. Juliticl' .Frankfurt<•r went ,.:o far a:s to ,;ug-
ge~t that abuse~ of the writ~ of a~,;t~tancl' wen• ·',o dPeply felt by thP 
ColomE'~ a,; to be OJW of the potent eausrs of the H<•vohtttou." Unttect 
State11 r . Rabinowitz. 339 r. S. 56, li9 (1950) (di~"enting opmiou) . 
0 .f.O!II'S \ . United States, 31>7 t'. R 49;{, -!9\:l (1958) .. 
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One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not 
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile 
on the street or highway because they have probable cause to 
believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See 
United States ·v. N/(trtinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561-562 
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891. 896 (1975); 
Texas v. White, 423 U. S. (i7, 68 (1975). As the Court said 
in Carroll v. Un·ited States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925), 
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, 
practically since the hegiHning of the Government, as 
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a 
store, dwelling house or othet· stmcture in respect of 
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, 
and a search of a ship. motor boat, wagon or automobil~ 
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure 
a warrant .... " 7 
There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between 
automobiles and other priva.te property. First, as the Court 
repeatedly has recognized , the inherent mobility of automo-
biles often makes it impracticable . to obtain a warrant. See, 
e. g., United States v. Chadurick, supra, at 12; Chambers v. 
1~laroney, 399 U. S., 49-50 ( 1970); Carroll v. Umted States, 
t.vupra . ln addition. the configuration. use, and regulation of 
automobiles substantially dilutes the reasonable expectation 
of privacy that often exists with t·espect to differently situated 
]li'Operty. Hee Rakas v. Illinois, - U . S. - - , - (1978) 
7 Tlw wilhngnr~s of rourt~ to rxcu~<' the ab~enc(' of a warmnt where 
'-'JlOIItaneon~ scarche~ are rrquirrd of H vduclc on thr road ha8 !rei to what 
i~ ('alled the "nutomobil<• rxccptwn " to the warmnt requirmwnt, although 
iht' PXCt:']>tJon dor~ not mvarinbl~· appl~· whrnrver automobJie~ are ~earched. 
SP< ·, e. f/ .. Coo!idgl' v. New Ha111pshu·!', 403 ll. S. Hi!, 4(il-462 (1971) 
("TIH' word ' a<~tomollll<' ' 1~ not n tali~nmn 111 who~P pn'.~P!Jel' tlw .Fourth 
Amendmrnt fadr' away and di~appPars. " ). Sre gt-urrally :VIoylau , The 
Autonwhil<' Exerpt1011 : What it i~ and What it 1~ 11ot-A Ratwnalr iu. 
Rt•:m·IJ of n Ck:H'Pl' LHbrl, 21 :\IP!'!'PI' L. Rrv 987 ( .1971)}. 
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(POWELL, J .. concurring); r·nited States\', Chadwick, ~;upra,· 
South Dakota Y. Opperman, 428 U. R. 364. 3(i8 (1\:17(5) . 
III 
In the present case, the State argues that the warrantless 
search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and 
its progcny.8 The police acted properly-indeed commend-
ably-in apprehending respondent and his luggage. They 
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green 
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant 
had proviued a detailed account of respondent 's expected 
arrival at the Little Rock Aiport. which account proved to be 
accurate in every uetail, incluuing the color of the suitcase i11 
which respondellt would be carrying the marihuana. Having 
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven 
away 111 the taxi. the pohce were Justified in stoppmg the 
vehtcle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the suitcase they 
suspected contained contraband. See Chamber~; v. Maroney, 
1mpra, at 52. At oral argument respondent couceded that th8 
stop of the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitu-
tionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 30, 44-46. 
The only question, therefore. is whether the police, rather 
than nnmediately searching the suitcase without a warrant, 
should have taken it to the police statio.11 with respondent 
and obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of 
luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a war-
rant. In Chadwick we declined an invitation to extend the 
Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, notiug that neither 
of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers 
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their 
'Hr:-;pondent concede;,; that tlw ~llltl'a~e wa;; lm; proJwrty, ;,;ee Brh'f for 
Rr~pondrnt :3, and so there i~ no que~Stion of h1:s ::;tanding to challrnge the 
search. Ser Simrnous v. United State~, :mo lT :::; :~77, ;{87-:1R8 (1968) . 
C:f Rakas ' . Tllinoi~,- l ' .S - .- ( 1978) 
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control at the time of the search. Consequently, "there was 
not the slightest danger that l the luggage J or its contents 
could haw been removed before a valid search warrant could 
be obtained.'' 433 1'". S .. at 13. And. as we observed in that 
case, luggage. unlike automobiles, is a common repository fot' 
one's personal effects. and therefore is associated with an 
expectation of privacy largely absent with respect to auto-
mobiles. I bid. 
The State argues, nevertheless. that the warrantless search 
of respondent's ~:;uitcasP was proper. not because thP property 
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an 
automobile lawfully stopped ami searched on the street. In 
effect. the State would have us extend Carroll to allow war-
t•antless searches of everything found within an automobile, 
a~:; well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above. the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas found our decision in Chadw~ck virtually 
controlling Ill this case.1' The State contends. however. that 
Chadwick does not control because in that case the vehicle had 
remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been 
placed in its trunk ami that therefore no argument was made 
that the automobile search exception was applicable. This 
Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitu-
tionality of a warrantless Sf'arch of luggage taken from an 
automobik lawfully stopped. Rather, the decisions to elate 
have mvolved searches of some integral part of the automo-
9 Th!:' fn<'IH of tlw two case~ at'!:' ~imdar in ~<·vrral entical l'<'::iJWCt~ . In 
Chaduotck. n locked. 200-pouiHI footlock!:'r wa~ ,.;earelwcl w1thout a warmnt 
after thr pohce, nctm~ with probaiJh• <·au::;!:', had tnk<·n 1t from tlw trunk of 
a Jlltrk<'d automobtlc. In thP pre~eut ca~r, rP~ptmdPnt's <·omparattvPiy :;mall, 
unlorkPd Hlltlea:;e al,.;o had b!:'rn plated m th!' trunk of an automolnle and 
wa~ ll<'ar<'lwd w1t hout a warrant b~· poh<·!:' a<'l mg upon probahl<· rau,.;c. We 
do not vww tlw thfferetH't' 11l the ,qze::; of th<' footlorker and :;tutca~c us 
matPnal hc·r<'. nor rhd n'~JlOIHknt':- l'atlurP to lock ht~ ,.;mtca~e alter it:, 
fundamental rharaclt•r a~ a rrpo:;Jtor~· for Jlt'I'>'Oilal, private !:'tl'eets. Cf 
1-Utt', .\ Hec·onstdPraiJOll of the Katz Exp!'CLHilOll or Pnvaey '["(:':;(, 7{ii 
,'tid~ L H!:'v 1.1~ , 170 (HJ7"' ) 
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bile. ee. e. g., South Dakota v. Opperma11, 428 C. R. 364, 
366 (1!>76) ( glovP compartment); 'L'exas Y. White, 423 C S. 
67. 68 ( 1075) (passenger colllpartnwnt); Cady Y. Dombrowski, 
413 1!. S. 433. 437 (una) (trunk); Chambers v. Nfaroney, 39~) 
P. S. 42. 44 ( 1970) (concealed compartment under the dash-
board); Carroll , .. [ 7 ~tited States, 267 r. S., at 136 (behind 
the upholstering of the seats). 
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its bmden of 
demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage 
properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the 
trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as · the vehicle in 
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of 
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the 
search- after the police have seized the object to be searched 
and have it securely within their control.'" See 433 ·e. S .. at 
13. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the 
extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from 
which it was taken. 1' Accordingly, as a general rule there is 
no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from 
automobiles thall of luggagP taken from other places.'~ 
10 Thr dillirultie~ i ~ ~r1zing and ~t·eming automohll<'" havp lt>d the Court 
to makl' ~pr<'Iai allmrHnr·r~ for tiH'ir ~l'ar<'h. See 11. 14, infm . 
1 1 There ma~· lw r·a~P" 111 wlnrh tlw ,:pet'ial !•xigPIIcir~ of th<· ~1tuation 
would ju,;tif~ · the warrant]p,;,; ~l'a rel1 of a ,.;uit<'a,;('. ('f. Cady Y. Dombrvte-
-lkt, 413 P. 8. 4:3:{ (197:{) (polic·e had rm~on to ~~~~Jll'<'t automohik• trunk 
eo iJtaint•d a weapon) . (;pnerally, howPV!'r. ;:uch PxigPllCil'>J will d('pend 
upon thl• probabit' l'Ont!• nt~ of tlw lug;gagP and tiH' "u~prct '~ a1•ep,;,; to tho,.;e 
l'Oilt(•IJt"- noi upon whl't hPr t hr· lugg;agr i~ t n ken from ail au tomobilt•. In 
the prP"t•nt ca::;e the Stat<' Ita~ c·onc·Nied thai thNP Wl'I'P no ~Jlt'Cial t'XIgrn-
<'It·~- :::lrl' Tr. of Ond Arg., at lti. 
::".' 01 do w<· con:O::der 1 ht• con~i 1t utwnaltt~· of ::>ra rclw~ of luggag(' incident 
to the at'l'l'lii of it~ po",;~'""or . Sc•f', e. ff .. United State/! v. Rvbiusun, -114 
r. S. 218 (197:3). The State ha:; not argued that re::;poudPnt 's suitcase· 
wa, ~earchPd incident to his arrP,.;t, and it appear" that tlw bag was not 
wJthm hi, "immrdiatP control'' at the tim!' of the :;Parr·h . 
1" \Vr haw rreognizPd that pPr,omd prOJH'l't~ · brought I!Ito tlw eountry 
may br "<'arrhPd at tlw hord<•r uudcr <'ir·cum~tan<'e>' that would not otht'r-
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Similarly, a suitcase taken from a.n automobile stopped on 
the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expecta-
tion of privacy than is associated with luggage take11 from 
other locations. One is not less inclined to place private, 
personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase 
is to be carried in au automobile rather than transported by 
other means or tempora.rily checked or storetl. Indeed, the 
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for 
personal items when one wishes to transport them.u Accord-
wi~L· ju~tify a warrantle~:; ,;parch. SPP Cuited State/!\'. Ramsey, 4:H U.S. 
fiG6. 61()-617 (1977). Arkan:;a>' dOl'S not a:s,.;prt, how<~vPr. that thP search 
t>f rPHpondPut ':s luggage wn:,; a border :-;pan·h. Yiorpovf'r, it Ill!l~· lw that 
thP public :safety rf'quires luggagl' be :;parched without a warrant m :somt' 
cm·um:-;tauce:;-,;uch a:; whf'n luggag<· i~ about to bf' placed onto an 
airplarw. Thi,; prf'8f'nt:s que:stwns under the Fourth Anwndmf'nt wholly 
au~(·ut from tlw prf':-;<·nt caHl'. 
It i~ hPyond questwn that the police ea:sily could have obtmn(•d a :search 
warnmt to :,;earch I'('Spondent'" bag if thf'y had tahn thE' ~uitca:sP to a 
lll<lgi:stmtP. Thf'y had prohablr cnu:sP to bPlieve not only that !'(':;pondent 
wa~ carrylllg marihuana, but abo that the contraband wa~ containrd in 
1I1P suitca,.;p that thPy o<<·izt·•d. ThP StatE' argur,; that undPr tlw circum-
stanee:,; of this cas<' mconvPniencr to all roncrrnrd would have bern the 
only re;;ult of c{pfrrring ~l'arch of tlw suitcase until a warraut wa:o obtainPd. 
Tho~P m l'(~;:;polldrnt'~ po::ittiou who find ~uch mcouvPlllE'l!Ce UJJHccPIJtablP 
ma~· avoid it ~imply by con~<'IIting to tlw ~earch . 
13 Not all contamers and package~ found by polieP duriug the course of 
ft ,;~rch will drservf' tlw full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, 
~omr contamrrs (for f'xamplP a kit of burglar toob or a gun cn,;p) by tht>ir 
v<·r~· nature cannot support a11~· rf'a>'onablP expeetation of privacy bPcau::;e 
their routpnt;; ran be inferred from thrir outward apprarancr. Snnilal'ly, 
in ::;orm• rase:> the contPllt~ of a package will bP open to '' plam virw," 
tlwreiJy obvwting tlw nePd for a warnmt. Sre Harris, .. United States. :390 
l'. S. 23-!, 236 (196~) (per curiam). There Will b<· difticuhtes Ill detPrmin-
lllg \\'hich parcpl:,; taken from an automobile rpquirr a warrant for thrir 
srarrh and winch do not. Our dt'ci;;ion in thrs ca:se mean::; ouly that a 
warrant genernlly 1~ n•quir<'d before per::;onal luggage run be ~earched and 
that the Pxtent to whtch th(~ Fourth Arrwndment apphr~ to contamers and 
othPr parcel~ dt>pPnd" not nt nil upon whetlwr thPy an~ ~wizrd from Hll 
.m.1 om.l)hik . 
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ingly. thr reasons for not requiring a warrant for tlw !:warch of 
an automobile do not apply to st>arches of JWrsonal luggagr 
taken by police from automobiles. vV f' thf'rPforr find 110 
justification for thf' extension of C'arroll and its progeny to the 
warrantless search of ont>'s personal luggagr men'ly because it 
was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.].! 
I u sum. we hold that the warrant requirelllent of the Fourth 
Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an auto-
mobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other 
locations. Thus. insofar as thP police are entitled to search 
such luggage without a wanant, their actions must be justified 
"\\'pan· uot Jll'r~uad!'d by tht• State·~ aq~;tnneut that , undt•r Chambet.~ 
\' . J]QI'OI/ <'lj, ;~99 t' . S. -l:! (l!:J/0) , if tht• j)OliC!' Wt'l'!' Plltttlf•d to ~PIZl' t}l!' 
,;liJI<·a~e, tht•n tlwy WPI't' t•ntltlt•d to ,;parch it. lu Chambl!rs. the Court 
upheld tlw wanantl!'~,; ~Pa rch of an antomobilr ~topprd on tlw highwa.' · 
b~ · polt ct• who lwliev!'d that tt >' tH·cnpant8 had rol,f:wd a ga,;ohtH· ~tatton 
:1 ,.; hort time bE' fore . Tlw Court recogntzrd that '· [a I rgnabl~·. lJC'rau~e of 
the prefrn'nce for a mngt:>tntlP·~ judgnwnt. only the immobilizatwn of thP 
t·:t r ~hould lw permitted until a ~earch warrant i~ ohtaitwd .... " !d .. at 
.)1 Xotl('tht-lr~~. the Court ruled that a warrant!<·~~ ,.;<·arch wa.; p:o' rnli~­
, JIJ!e . conchtding that thrn· wa ~ no eon,;titutwnal ditl'Pn•nee U(•tw('Pll the 
illt ru ~10 11 of ,;ptJ~mg nnd holdmg tlw automouile unttl a wnrmnt could ul" 
ubt: tuted, on th<· oJH' hand, and ~rarchin!!: th<· vPhirlt• without 11 wanaut, 
011 the ol het 
'V<· vte\\, howl'VPr, tlw ~P:zure of a stntcH ~l· a;; qutle differP!It from the 
.H<'tzu rt• of 1\11 automobtlP. Itt ('hambers. tf IIH' Comt had r('(fltll'Pd 
1--Pizun• and holding of t hP vehidr, it would hav!' impo~Pd a cun;:;tttutionnl 
rPq uiremt•nt upon peltcl' dc•pa rtnwnt,; of all ~jzp,.. around tltt• country to 
have a"atiahlP the peoph• and equipment tWCP~sar~· to lran,;port mtpounded 
automohil<·~ to ~Otlll' central Juration until warrallt~ could br ,.:pcun•d. 
\lon•o · Pr, once sri zed automobil(•" wl't'r tak<•u from I he highway tlw policl' 
would hr rP~pon~iblP for providing ,.:onw appropriatP locatiou whl•re the~ · 
could br hpt, with dtH' rE'gard to !lw ,.;afrty of the vehidl'::i aud tht•tr 
<•o Jtt< · nt ~. uuttl <I magi;;trate rulNI on lhl· upplicatwn for a warrant. Sueh 
·t eon"tt t u tiona! rPqttm•mput t herl'forp would have Hnp~sed ~t·vere, t•\·en 
impo>'~tbiP, bun!<'n~ 011 mau.'· poht·(·' departmt•nt.-<. St>P :'\ote, Warraul-
lt•,..,.. ::::<•arclw" and :::lt•Jzure" of Automobile;:;, l:{i HHJ'\' . L. B~·v. ~~5, ~-H­
.-.-l~ (1H74). ~o eomparablt· burd <· n~ ar<' likt·ly to exi,;t with n',.;pt·el lo 
tlt;• ~l' IZIII'(! of prr~otlai lll~!!<lg!' . 
i7-I·Hl7- ( ll'l:\ ll )\' 
un<l<-r some exceptio11 to tl11• warrallt requirement othPl' than 
that applicable to automobiles stopp<>d 011 tlw higiJway. 
\YherP-as in tlw prPsen t ca~<>-the police. without <•ndangcr-
ing themselves or risking los~ of tlw Pvidencf'. lawful ly have 
detained one su~:;pectecl of erimi11al activity and secured his 
suitcasP, they should delay thr search tlwreof until aftPr JUdi-
•al a J Jroval has been obtained. In this way. constitutio11aJ 
..,-~=;;;;..-;-n-~r,:.ii!;~'·I~J.!::ts~o~f. sUSJWCts · prior .i udicial revi<•w of searciH•s will bP 
f u Jly -+¥' ~·~r. 




To: Justice Powell 
Re: Arkansas v. Sanders 
As you can see, Justice Stevens is not entirely 
pleased with our opinion. Justice Marshall asked, through 
his clerk, that you be told that he is very pleased with 
the opinion, that he disagrees with Justice Stevens, and 
that he would urge you not to make any changes along the 
lines suggested. He also said he would be happy to discuss 
the matter with you. 
Our reaction here in chambers is similar to that of 
Justice Marshall. If the police know the contraband is in 
the automobile, but are not sure where, they can search the 
entire car (save the luggage) and then obtain a warrant for 
the search of the luggage, having determined by process of 
elimination where the contraband must be. Moreover, to draw 
attention to this situation by distinguishing it will not 
avoid deciding the issue, but rather will risk deciding it 
sub silentio in a case in which it was not presented. Finally, 
the more we narrow the holding of this case, the less guidance 
we will afford trial courts and police--which was the reason; 
we took the case in the first place. 
Having said all this, I recommend that we wait and 
see what your Brethren have to say. If necessary to keep 




,jnprmu Qfllltrl d tlrt ~b ,jhttts 
~Mfrin:ghm. ~. QJ. 2.Llhfl!~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 4, 1979 
Re: No. 77-1497, Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Lewis, 
Although I agree with your fine opinion and expect 
to join it, I would be happier if you could see your way 
clear to deleting the last sentence on page 7 and the last 
sentence of the run-over paragraph at the top of page 9. 
The elimination of these sentences is not a condition 
of my joining your opinion. But, if you decide to keep 
them, perhaps you would be willing to somewhat modify their 
language. 
In the last sentence on page 7, could "substantially 
dilutes" be changed to something like "may sometimes dilute"? 
And could the language in the sentence toward the top of page 
9 be changed to read "luggage is a common repository for one's 
personal effects, and therefore, is inevitably associated with 
the expectation of privacy."? 
I have just read a copy of John's letter to you, and 
would have no objection to narrowing the opinion along the 
lines he suggests, if you think it necessary or appropriate 
to do so. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~JtVUlttt QfMtrf o-f tfrt 'Jtnittb- ~bdtg 
,ra,glfin:ghttt. ~. <lf. 21l.;r~~ 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 4, 1979 
RE: No. 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Lewis: 
At Conference I believe I suggested that there may 
be a distinction between a case in which the police have 
probable cause to believe that a particular piece of 
luggage contains contraband and another case in which 
they merely have probable cause to believe that contraband 
is located somewhere in an automobile, possibly within 
a piece of luggage in the car. I also suggested that we 1 
should avoid deciding the latter case because it comes a 
good deal closer to the automobile exception. 
As your opinion is presently written, I believe it 
decides both cases and therefore is somewhat broader 
than necessarl{JLn its holding. If the Court is disposed 
to accept your proposed disposition, I will write a short 
statement concurring in the result. On the other hand, 
if you are amenable to narrowing the holding, relatively 
minor changes would pick up my vote. 
Respectfully, 
fA 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
jln;rrtmt Qfllurlllf firt ~b Jtattg 
--a,g~ ~. <If. 2ll,?~~ 
JusTicE wM . J . BRENNAN, JR. Apri 1 5, 1979 
RE: No. 77-1497 Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Lewis: 
I think this is a very fine and helpful opinion 
and I am happy to join. I hope you will not adopt 
John's suggestion to narrow it. I do think, however, 
that Potter's sugqestions are well taken. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-1497 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
State of Arkansas, Petitioner, I 
v. c 
I 
. d Supreme ourt of Arkansas . 
.JOnme James San ers. 
[April -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether, in the absence of 
exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant 
before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly 
stopped and searched for contraband. We took this case by 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve 
some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our 
decision in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), to 
warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.1 
I 
On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock, 
Ark., Police Department received word from an informant 
that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an 
American Airlines flight at gate number one of the Municipal 
Airport of Little Rock, Ark. According to the informant, 
respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing 
rnarihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent 
well, as in January of 1976 the informant had given the Little 
Rock Police Department information that had led to re-
spondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana. 
1 Comp:ne Umted States v. Finnegan, 568 F . 2d 637, 641-642 (CA9 
1977), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F . 2d 1175, 1178- 1179 (CAS 1978) 
(en bane). 
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Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers 
placed the airport under surveillance. As the informant had 
predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate one. The police 
watched as respoudent deposited some hand luggage in a 
waiting taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met 
a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo. 
While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline 
baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by 
the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his com-
panion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which 
he had put his luggage. .Rambo waited a short while in the 
airport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing 
the green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle. 
When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent, 
Rambo. and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow 
officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car, stopped 
the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of 
the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle, 
where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking 
the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police 
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to 
be 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags. 
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged 
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in viola-
tion of Ark. Stat. Ann. ~ 82-2617 (1976).~ Before trial, 
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the 
suitcase. contending that the search violated his rights under 
the Fourth anti Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court 
held a hearing on January 31, 1977, and denied the suppres-
sion motion without explanation. After respondent's convic-
2 Jn addition to tlw marihuana found in 1hc :suitca:sP, police officers 
fou!l(l one ounce of heroin hidden iu their patrol car after tran:sporting 
!{ambo to police headquar1rr~ . Accordingly, Hambo abo wa:,; charged 
w1th poH:;E'8:siou of heroin with in1rn1 to deliver. Immediately before trial 
on both counts, t.lw court severed the heroiu pos:;eRsioil rount for later 
t rial. 
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tion by a jUI'y on February 3, 1977, he was sentenced to 10 
years in prison and was fined $15,000. 
On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed respond-
ent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have 
suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through 
an unlawful search of the suitcase. 262 Ark. 595, 559 S. "T· 
2d 704 (1977). Relying upon United States v. Chadwick, 
supra, and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971), 
the court concluded that a warrantless search generally must 
be supported by "probabl~:> cause coupled with exigent circum-
stances." 262 Ark., at 599, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706. In the 
present case, the court found there was ample probable cause 
for the police officers' belief that contraband was contained in 
the suitcase they searched. The court found to be wholly 
lacking, however, any exigent circumstance justifying the 
officers' failure to secUI'e a warrant for the search of the lug-
gage. With the police in control of the automobile and its 
occupants, there was no danger that the suitcase and its 
contents would be rendered unavailable to clue legal process. 
The court concluded, therefore, that there was "nothing in this 
set of circumstances that would lend credence to an assertion 
of impracticality in obtaining a search warrant.'' 262 Ark., 
a.t 600, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706.3 
II 
Although the general principles applicable to claims of 
:Fourth Amendment violations are well settled, litigation over 
requests for suppression of highly relevant evidence continues 
to occupy much of the attention of courts at all levels of the 
sta.te and federal judiciary. Courts and law enforcement 
3 " With the suitcase safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to under-
tnke the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant." 
262 Ark. 595, 601, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 707. The court also rejected the 
State's contention that luggnge is entitled to a le::;ser protection against 
warrantless searches than are other private areas, such as homes. It noted 
that suitcases, unlike automvbile::;, cu::;tom:uily ane ilhe lie_posiitorie;:; for _per-
OOltat effects. 
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officials often find it difficult to discern the proper application 
these principles to individual cases, because the circumstances 
giving rise to suppression requests can vary almost infinitely. 
Moreover, an apparently small difference in the factual situa-
tion frequently is viewed as a controlling difference in deter-
mining Fourth Amendment rights. The present case presents 
an example. Only two Terms ago, we held that a locked foot-
locker could not lawfully be searched without a warrant, even 
though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile 
parked at a curb. U·11ited States y. Chadwick, supra. In 
earlier cases, on the other hand, the Court sustained the con-
stitutionality of warrantless searches of automobiles and 
their contents under what has become known as the "automo-
bile exception " to the warrant requirement. See, e. g., Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 ( 1970); Carroll v. United States, 
267 U. S. 132 (1925). We thus are presented with the task 
of determining whether the warrantless search of respondent's 
suitcase falls on the Chadwick or the Chambers/Carroll side 
of the Fourth Amendment line. Although in a sense this is 
a line-drawing process, it must be guided by established 
principles. 
We commence with a summary of these principles. The 
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security of per-
sons in two important ways. First, it guarantees " [ t] he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In addi-
tion, this Court has interpreted the amendment to include the 
requirement that normally searches of private property be 
performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance 
with thP warrant clause.1 See, e. g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 
4 The warnmt (']au:sr of thr Fourth Amendmrnt provide:> that, "no War-· 
rant~ shall isstu', but npou probable cau:se, :;upported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and partic\llnrly describing the placr to be :searched and the prr:;ons 
or things to be seizrd.'' The Fourth Amendment ha;; bE'en madr fully 
applicablr. to the StaN'::> by tho FourtePlJt.h Amendment . S<·e Mapp v. 
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U. S. 385, 390 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 
1, 9 (1977); United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 
347, 357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 
( 1925). In the ordinary ease, therefore, a search of private 
property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to 
a properly issued sea.rch warrant. The mere reasonableness 
of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances, is Hot a substitute for the judicial warrant required 
under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. United 
States District Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v. 
New Ha·mpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971), 
"ft]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our 
constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the 
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this 
country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow 
'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or 
should be, an important working part of our machinery of 
government, operating as a matter of course to check the 
'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive 
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement." 
The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our 
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that indi-
vidual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation 
of powers and divisio11 of functions among the different 
branches and levels of government." United States v. United 
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that con-
clusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search 
"be drawn by ·a neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
bemg judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States, 
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable 
Ohio, :367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Wolf\'. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In 
thi;; opmion we rl'fer to tlw Fourth Amendment as it ~o applirs to the 
81 a tP of A rkanl:ia:>. 
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assertions of executive authority. See M cDouald v. · United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948).6 
Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. These have been established where it was con-
cluded that the public interest required some flexibility iu the 
application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a 
prerequisite for a search. See [!nited States v. ·Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 ( 1976). Thus, a few "jealously and 
carefully drawn"(; exceptions provide for those cases where the 
societal costs of obtaining a warrant. such as danger to law 
officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence. outweigh 
the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral ma.gistate. See 
United States v. Urnited States District Court, SU'fYta, at 318. 
But because each exception to the warrant requirement in-
variably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search 
may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been 
carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the 
exemption to show the need for it." United States v. Jeffers, 
342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951). See Chime{ v. California, 3~)5 U. S. 
752. 7()2 (1969); Katz v. United States, supra., at 357. More-
over, we have limited the reach of each exception to tha.t which 
is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society. 
See Mincey v. ArizO'na, supra, at 393; United States v. Chad-
wick, supra, at 15 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 
at 45.5. 
5 Thr nred for a carefully drawn, limited warrant for searches of private 
premi~cs wa~ the product in large pnrt of the colonist~' re:;entment of the 
writs of a:;sisbmce to whieh tlwy were subjected by the Engli;;h. See 
Unitl'd States v. Chadwick. 433 U. S. 1, 8 (1977); ,l. Landynski. Search 
and SrizurP and the SupremP Court, 19 (1966) ; N. La~son, Thr History 
and Development of thr Fourth Amendmrnt to the Unitrd StntrH Con-
~titution .'i1-78 (19:~7). :Mr . .Tu~ticr Frankfurter went ><o far a~ to ,;ug-
gest that nbuse~ of the writ~ of a":sistance were ":;o dreply felt b~· the 
ColoniPI" n~ 1o hr onr of the potPnt cnu~Ps of thr Hevolution ." United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, (i9 (1950) (di;;:;pnting opinion) . 
H.Jones v. United :StateiS, 357 U. S, 493, 499 (1958). 
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One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not 
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile 
on the street or highway because they have probable cause to 
believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543. 561-562 
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 (1975); 
Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67. 68 (1975). As the Court said 
m Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925), 
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the Fourth Amendme11t has been construed, 
practically since the beginniHg of the Government, as 
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a 
store. dwelling house or other structure in respect of 
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, 
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, 
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure 
a, warra,n t. . . ." 7 
There nre essentially two reasons for the distinction between 
automobiles and other private property. First, as the Court 
repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automo-
biles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See, 
e. g., United States v. C:hadtvick, supra, at 12; Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U. S .. 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 
8Upra. In addition. the configuration. use. and regulation of 
automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expect.ation of\ 
privacy that exists with respect to difl'erently situated prop-
erty. See Rakas v. Illinois,- U.S.-,- (1978) (POWI<JLL, 
7 The willingness of courts to excu~e the absence of a warrant where 
spontan<•ou;;; searches are requirPd of a vehicle on the road has led to what 
i~ rallrcl thl' "automobile exc:eption" to the warrant ret~uirement, although 
the rxr<'ption clot•s not invariabl~· apply whenever automobiles are searched. 
SP<', 1'. (/ .. Coolidge Y. Neu• Hampshire, 40:3 U. S. 44:{, 461-462 (1971) 
("Tiw word 'automobile ' is not a tali:sman in who:,;p prPsence the Fourth 
Anw11dment fad!'S away and di~nppru.r:,;. " ). See generally Moylan, The 
Automobile Exception: What it i~ and What it iH not-A Hationale in 
Searrh of a Clearer Lnl>el, 27 i\lcrcPr L. Hev. 987 (1976) . 
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J. , concurring); United States v. Chadwick, supra; South 
Dakoln , .. Opperman, 428 1'. R. 364. 368 (1976); Cardwell v. 
Lewis, 417 U. R. 583. 5HO (1974) (plurality opinion); Cady v. 
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 441-442 ( H)73); Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (PowELL, J. , concurring) . 
III 
In the present case, the State argues that the wa.rrantless 
· search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and 
its progeny.8 The police acted properly-indeed commend-
ably- in apprehending respondent ami his luggage. They 
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green 
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant 
had provided a detailed account of respondent's expected 
arrival at the Little Rock Aiport. which account proved to be 
accurate in every detaiL including the color of the suitcase in 
which respondent would be carrying the marihuana. Having 
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven 
away in the taxi. the police were justified in stopping the 
vehicle, searching it on the spot. and seizing the suitcase they 
suspected contained contraband. See Chambers v. Jl1aroney, 
supra, at 52. At oral argumeu t respondent conceded that the 
stop of the taxi aud the seizure of the suitcase were constitu-
tionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 30. 44- 46. 
The only question , therefore, is whether the police, rather 
than immediately searching the suitcase without a warrant, 
should have taken it to the police station with respondent 
and obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of 
luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a war-
rant. In Chadwick we declined an invitation to extend the 
Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting that neither 
~ He~pondrnt eoncedes that the suitcase wa:; his property, see Brief for 
[~e~ pondcnt :3, and ,;o there i~ no question of hi::s standing to challenge the 
:;carch . Sre Sirnmo'll s v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 387-3&"1 (1968) ~ 
( ('f Rakas v. lllinois, ·-U. S - •. - (1978) . 
'. 
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of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers 
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their 
control at the time of the search. Consequently. "there wa.s 
not the slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents 
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could 
be obtained." 433 U. S., at 13. And, as we observed in that 
case, luggage is a common repository for one's personal effects, 
and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of 
privacy. Ibid. 
The State argues, nevertheless. that the warrantless search 
of respondent 's suitcase was proper, not because the property 
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an 
automobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street. In 
effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow war-
rantless searches of everything found within an automobile, 
as well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas foulld our decision in Chadwick virtually 
controlling in this case.0 The State contends, however. that 
Chadwick does not control because in that case the vehicle had 
remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been 
placed in its trunk and that therefore no argument was made 
that the automobile search exception was applicable. This 
Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitu-
u The facts of the two cases are similar in several critical respects. In 
Chadwick, a locked, 200-pound footlocker was searched without n, warrant 
after the police, acting with probablr cau:se, had taken it from the trunk of 
a parked automobile. In the presPnt ca~e, re::;pondent 's comparatively :small, 
unlocked ~uitcnsp abo had been placPcl in the trunk of an automobile and 
W<)~ searched without a warrnnt by policr acting upon probable cause. We 
do not view tht> difference in the ,;ize,.; of the footlocker and suitcase as 
material here; nor did respondent's failure to lock his suitcase alter its 
fundamental charaeter as a repository for personal, private effect::;. Cf. 
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 7(} 
Mieh. L. Rev . 154, 170 (1977) . 
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tiouality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from an 
automobile lawfully stopped. Rather, the decisions to date 
have involved searches of some integral part of the automo-
bile. See. e. y., South Dakota Y. Oppennan, 428 U. S. 364, 
366 ( 1976) (glove compartment); Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 
67, 68 (1975) (passenger compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski, 
413 U.S. 433, 437 ( 1973) (trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 
U. S. 42, 44 (1970) (concealed compartment under the dash~ 
board); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S., at 136 (behind 
the upholstering of the seats). 
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of 
demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage 
properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the 
truuk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in 
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of 
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the 
search-after the police have seized the object to be searched 
and have it securely within their COJJtrol. 1" See 433 U. R., at 
13. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the 
extent of its mobility is iu no way affected by the place from 
which it was taken. 11 Accon.lingly. as a general rule there is 
10 The difficulti(•s i~ :;eizing and seeuring :111tomobilcs have led the Court 
to make special allowance:; fur their search. Seen. 14, infm. 
11 There may be caHrs in which the special exigrncies of the situation 
would ju~tify the warrantle:;s search of a suitcase. Cf. Cady v. Dombrow-
skt , 41;{ U.S. 43a (1973) (police had reason to suspect automobile trunk 
rontainC'd a weapon). Generally, however, such rxigencirs will depend 
upon the probable contents of the luggage and the su:;pect's acre::;;; to tho:;c 
contrnt~-not upon whether thr luggage is taken from an automobi l<'. In 
thP prr,:<?nt ca::;c the State has corH'!'cl<?d that there wrrP no special exigen-
t'JE'~ . SrP Tr. of Oral Arg., at Hi. 
1\'or uo we cou~idPr tlw cou~titutionality of ,:;earches of luggagr incident 
to thP arre:;t of it:; po~ses;;or. St'c, e. g., United States v. Robiuson, 414 
U. S. 218 (197:3) . The State ha;; not argued tha.t respondent's suitcase 
wa:; searchrd incident to his arre~t. and 1t appear:; that the bag was not 
w1thm h1s "immed.wte ront.rol" at the time of the ~carch , 
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no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from 
automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.12 
Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on 
the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expecta· 
tion of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from 
other locations. One is not less inclined to place private, 
personal possessions iu a suitcase merely because the suitcase 
is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by 
other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the 
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for 
personal items when one wishes to transport them. 1 ~ Accord· 
12 WP bavP recogniz~·d that per~oual proJwrt~· brought into tht' country 
may be ~earched at the bordPr undpr circumstanc~ that would not other-
wi~e ju~tify a warrantlPs~ i>earch . SeP United States v. Ra·msey, 431 U. S. 
606, tl16-617 (1977). ArkansaH does not a;:;sert, how<,ver, that tlw search 
of respondent's luggagP was a border ~earch. MoreovPr, ii may bP that 
thP puulic safet~· requires luggage be searched without a warrant in some 
cirrurnstaucPs-such as when lnggag<' is about to be placed onto an 
airplane . This presrnts questions under the Fourth Amendment wholly 
HU:>f•nt from the prPsent ca~e . 
11 i;:; beyond question that the police Pasily could have obtained a search 
warrant to ~Parch rrspondpnt 's bag if th<>y had takrn thr suitcase to a 
magi"tratP. They had probablr cause to believe not only that rrspondent 
was carryiug marihuana , but also that thr contraband was contained in 
thP suitca~r that they ~eized. The Statr argues that under the circum-
l:!tnnre~ of thi~ ca~c iuconvrniencP to all concerned would have been the 
only r€'sult of drff'rring srarch of tlw suitcasr until a warrant was obtained. 
Tho::;C' in respondent 's position who find such inconvenience unacceptable 
may aYoid it simply by consmtiug to the search. 
13 Not all containers and packages found b:v police during the course of 
a senrch will deservf' thr full prot:<•ction of the .Fourth Amendment. Thus, 
l:!OmP contamf'rs (for €'xampl€' a kit of burglar tool~ or a gun ca::;r) by thrir 
1·er:v nature cannot ;,;upport any rPa;,;onable exprctation of privacy brcause 
th ~ ir coutPnts can be inferred from tlH'ir outward appearance. Similarly, 
in some ca~r~ the coutpnt:; of a packagr will be open to '"plain view," 
thrrrby obviating the nePd for a warrant. Sre Harris 1· . United States, 390 
U. S. ~34, 2:~6 (1968) (per cwiarn) . There will be dit!icultie,.; in determin-
ing which parcel:s taken from au automobile requin• a warrant for their 
~ea rrh and which do not. Our dcr1.~ion iu 1 his ras€' mean~ only iha t a 
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ingly, the r·easons for not requiring a warrant for the search of 
an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage 
taken by police from automobiles. We thereforf' find no 
justification for the extension of Cat-roll and its progeny to the 
warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it 
was located in au automobile lawfully stoppe<l by the police.H 
In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an auto-
warrant generally is rrquirrd brfor<• per;;orwl luggag<' can lw ~rarched :md 
that the rxteut to wh1rh the Fourth Amendment applie~ to containers and 
ollwr parcPIH clepc·ndH not at all upon whether thry arr ,.;eizPd from an 
automobil<'. 
1 1 WP a r<' not p<'rsua<.!Pd b~· the State'::; argument that, undrr Chambers 
v. Maroney, ;399 0. S. 42 (1970), if the polirr wrrr rntJtled to se1ze the 
suitca,;c•, thrn they wPrc entitled to srarch 1t. In Chambers. the Court 
uphPid the• warrautlr~" Hearrh of an automobile stoptwd on thr highway 
by police who helievPd that it:-; occupants had robbed a gasoliue statiOn 
a :short tim<' brfor<'. The Comt recogmzed that "La lrguably, bPcau~e of 
the preference for a magis! rate's judgmmt, only tht' immobiliznt iou of the 
car should br permitted until n s<'arch warrant is obtained .. .. " !d., at 
51. NonPtllf'lrss, the Court rulrd that a warrantle,;,; search wa,.; penni<'-
sJble, concluding that thrrc· wa~ no constitutional diffrrencr brtween the 
int ru$ion of seizing and holdiug thP automobile until a warrant could be 
obtained, on t hr one hand, and sParchiug 11H' vehicln Without a warrant, 
on tht> other . 
Wr view, however, thr :se1zure of a suitcase as quitr dd'ferent from the 
Heizure of au automobile. Iu Chambers, if thr Court had requirrd 
::wizure and holding of tbr vehicle, it would havr imposed a constitutional 
rrquirement upon pclice departments of all ~Size::; around th<' country to 
have a-·ailabl{· the pc·oplr nnd equipment nece::>sary to tran::;port impounded 
automobile~> to ::;omP central loc·ation until warrantH could br secured. 
:Yloreo· Pr, oncr seized automobile,.; wrre taken from th<' highway the police 
would U<' respon~iblr for providing ;:;ome approprwtr location where they 
could br krpt, with due regard to the safrty of the veh!clrs and their 
eoutruts, until n magi:strate ruil•d on thP application for a warrant. Such 
a. cout:titutional requirrnwnt thrrrforr would hav<• imposed :;rverr, even 
impo~s ! ble. burdrn,; on many pohce department;;. &>e Not~·, Warrant-
It•:;,; ~('<II'Ches and SPIZ\II'Ct-1 or Automobiles, 8i Harv. L. Hrv. R35, 841-
R4:l ( 1974). No comparable burden;:; arr likely to rxb1 with rE'spect to 
the seizurr of pert<onal IHggu!!;t' 
.... 
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mobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other 
locations. Thus, insofar as the police are entitled to search 
such luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified 
under some exception to the warrant requirement other than 
that applicable to automobiles stopped 011 the highway. 
Where-as in the present case-the police, without endanger-
ing themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have 
detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his 
suitcase, they should delay the search thereof until after judi-
cial approval has been obtained. In this way. constitutional 
rights of suspects to prior judicial review of searches will be I 
fully protected. 
The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is 
Affirmed. 
April 6 , 1979 
77-1497 Arkansas v . Sanders 
Dear John: 
~-·~' Thank you for your note of Apr i 1 4 about the above 
~ 't< 
case . I have some reluctance to make the chanqe you 
suggest, although I quite understand that it could be viewed 
ai an acceptable alternative . · 
~~ ,· 
('f'~ ..... ~ 
We took this case because of the apparent 
uncer,ta i-nty as to the scope of Chadwick . I recall your 
suggestion at ConfArence, but I 1 thouqht my mandate from a 
majority of the Justices - at least implicitly - was not to 
draw the distil"lction you suqgest . If the police know that 
the contraband is in the automobile, but are not sure where, 
under our cases they ~ay search the entire car except for 
close~ luqqage . If the contraband is not found in this 
search, the oolice certainly will have probable cause to 
obtain a warrant for search of the luggage . 
not identifying the 
I will, of course, abide by the 
I am making languaqe changes that I believe will 
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Dear Lewis, 
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Mr. Justice Powell 
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Apri 1 9, 1979 
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Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court, as recirculated April 6. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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Dear Harry: 
Please · join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 




To: Justice Powell 
Re: Justice Blackmun's dissent in Ark. v. Sanders 
After reading Justice Bl~ckmun's dissent, 
I have two responses. First, the problems he 
finds with our opinion, see pp. 6-8, are by in 
large problems--not produced by our opinion or 
by Chadwick--but rather are problems generally 
with Fourth Amendment law. Thus, the scope of 
a search incident to an arrest is a question 
that arises in every context--not just when 
automobiles are stopped. Similarly, which 
containers carry with them a reasonable expectatiDn 
of privacy is a question that has nothing to 
do with automobiles. Indeed, we point out as 
much in note 13 of our opinion. Thus, what kJ~stice 
Blackmun is really suggesting is not that w~·Lt~dy 
up the law surr~~ding the automobile except~on, 
but rather tha~ lwe use the automobile exception 
to oversimplify other problems arising under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Second, and more generally, as long as we 
continue to enforce the warrant clause of the 
Fourth Amendment , there will be close cases and 
cases in which evidence is suppressed that police 
plainly had probable cause to obtain. This is 
no reason, however, to seize upon fascile, bright-
line rules. If the police remain in doubt in 
close cases, let them get a warrant unnecessarily. 
By limiting the rule in this case to containers 
that police easily can transport to the station, 
we minimize the imposition upon police. 
Having said all of this, I have doubts about 
whether we need to respond to J~ice Blackmun. 
The responses I suggest may be obvious, and what 
Justice Blackmun has to say does not differ that 
much from his dissent in Chadwick. 
David 
~ ' 
To: The Chief 
Mr. Justic"' 
Mr. Just leo Stewart 
.Mr. Ju.::;tice Wh.itc 
Mr. J·ust ~ce H;:rGh::>.ll 
Mr. Jus tlce Po·11e 11 
Mr. Just!. c-:; H::l111,1uist 
Mr. Justic :.: St8vc.ns 
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From: Mr. Justice BlaclGnun 
Circulated: 1 S APR 1979 
Recirculated:_· ________ _ 
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. 
MR. 
. d. . . Pl.-~ l-t/' 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN, 1ssent1.ng. ~.
This case illustrates the difficulties and confusion 
~?~ 
that United States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s. ·1 (1977), has 
spawned and will continue to spawn. For reasons I ~i'~1 in 
dissent in Chadwick, id., at 18-22 and 24, I continue to feel 
that that decision was wrong. 
The Court today, in what may be a somewhat 
gratuitous approach (see Mr. Justice Stevens' concurrence, 
~
ante) , goes farther down the Chadwick road, undermines the 
automobile exception, and, while purporting to clarify the 
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confusion occasioned by Chadwick, creates, in my view, only 
greater difficulties for law enforcement officers, for prose-
cutors, for those suspected of criminal activity, and, of 
course, for the courts themselves. Still hanging in limbo, 
and probably soon to be litigated are the briefcase, the wal-
let, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind of 
container. 
I am unpersuaded by the Court • s casual statement, 
ante, at 9 n. 9, that Chad\'lick and this case are factually 
similar "in several critical respects ... Even accepting 
Chadwick as good law, which I do not, this, for me, is a 
different case. In Chadwick, the defendants were arrested, 
and a 200 pound, double-locked footlocker was seized, as the 
locker was being loaded into the open trunk of a stationary 
automobile. The relationship between the footlocker and the 
vehicle was sufficiently attenuated that the Government chose 
not to argue in this Court that the automobile exception ap-
No. 77-1497 
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plied. 433 u.s., at 11. Here, in contrast, the Little Rock 
police stopped a taxicab on a busy highway at the height of 
late afternoon traffic. They had probable cause to believe 
the taxi contained contraband narcotics. They opened the 
trunk, and briefly examined the contents of a small unlocked 
suitcase inside. The State has vigorously contended through-
out these proceedings that the warrantless search of the 
trunk and the unlocked suitcase was constitutionally 
permissible under the automobile exception. 
I fully agree. If "contraband goods concealed and 
illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may 
be searched for without a warrant," Carroll v. United States, 
267 u.s. 132, 153 (1925), then, in my view, luggage and 
similar containers found in an automobile may be searched for 
contraband without a warrant. The luggage, like the 
automobile transporting it, is mobile. And the expectation 
of privacy in a sui tease found in the car is probably not 
No. 77-1497 
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significantly greater than the expectation of privacy in a 
locked glove compartment or trunk. 
To be sure, as I acknowledged in Chadwick, 433 u.s., 
at 19, impounding the luggage without searching it would be a 
less intrusive alternative than searching it on the spot. 
But this Court has not distinguished between the "lesser" 
intrusion of a seizure and the "greater" intrusion of a 
search, either with respect to automobiles, Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 u.s. 42, 51-52 (1970), or with respect to 
persons subject to custodial arrest. United States v. 
Robinson, 414 u.s. 218, 235 (1973) .'!.../ And I see no reason 
to impose such a distinction here. Given the significant 
~/The Court stated in Chambers, 399 u.s., at 51-52: 
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's 
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be 
permitted until a search warrant is obtained; 
arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible 
until the magistrate authorizes the 'greater.' But 
which is the 'greater' and which the 'lesser' 
intrusion is itself a debatable question and the 
answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For 
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between 
on the one hand seizing and holding a car before 
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate 
and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search 
without a warrant." 
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encroachment on privacy interests entailed by a seizure of 
personal property, the addi tiona! intrusion of a search 
may well be regarded as incidental. Moreover, the 
additional protection provided by a search warrant will 
likely be minimal. Since the police, by hypothesis, have 
probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a 
warrant will be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming 
majority of cases. Finally, the carving out of a special 
warrant requirement for one type of personal property, but 
not for others, will impose untoward costs on the criminal 
justice systems of this country in terms of added delay 
and uncertainty. 
The impractical nature of the Court's line-drawing is 
brought into focus if one places himself in the position 
of the policeman confronting an automobile that properly 
has been stopped. In approaching the vehicle and its 
occupants, the officer must divide the world of personal 
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property into three groups. If there is probable cause to 
arrest the occupants, then under Chime! v. California, 395 
u.s. 752 (1969), he may search objects within the oc-
cupants' immediate control, with or without probable 
cause. If there is probable cause to search the auto-
mobile itself, then under Carroll and Chambers the entire 
interior area of the automobile may be searched, with or 
without a warrant. But under Chadwick and the present 
case, if any suitcase-like object is found in the car out-
side the immediate control area of the occupants, it can-
not be searched, in the absence of exigent circumstances, 
without a warrant. 
The inherent opaqueness of these "principles," in 
terms of the policies underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and the confusion to be created for all con-
cerned, is readily illustrated. Suppose a portable 
luggage-container-rack is affixed to the top of the 
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vehicle. Is the arresting officer constitutionally able 
to open this on the spot, on the theory that it is like 
the car's trunk, or must he remove it and take it to the 
station for a warrant, on the theory that it is like the 
200 pound footlocker in Chadwick? Or suppose there is 
probable cause to arrest persons seated in the front seat 
of the automobile, and a suitcase rests on the back seat. 
Is that suitcase within the area of immediate control, 
such that the Chadwick-Sanders rules do not apply? Or 
suppose the arresting officer opens the car's trunk and 
finds that it contains an array of containers -- an orange 
crate, an at tache case, a duffelbag 1 a cardboard box, a 
backpack, a totebag, and a paper bag. Which of these may 
be searched immediately, and which are so "personal" that 
they must be impounded for future search only pursuant to 
a warrant? The problems of distinguishing between "lug-
gage" and "some integral part of the automobile 1" ante, 
No. 77-1497 
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at 10; between luggage that is within the "immediate 
control" of the arrestee and luggage that is not; and 
between "personal luggage" and other "containers and pack-
ages" such as those most curiously described, ante, at 11 
n. 13, will be legion. The lines that will be drawn will 
not make much sense in terms of the policies of the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. And the heightened possibil-
ities for error will mean that many convictions will be 
overturned, highly relevant evidence again will be ex-
eluded, and guilty persons will be set free in return for 
little apparent gain in precise and clearly understood 
constitutional analysis. 
In my view, it would be better to adopt a clear-cut 
rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required 
to seize and search any personal property found in an 
automobile that may in turn be seized and searched without 
a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers. Cf. United 
No. 77-1497 
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States v. Chadwick, 433 u.s., at 21-22 and n. 3 (dissent-
ing opinion) • Such an approach would simplify the con-
sti tutional law of criminal procedure without seriously 
derogating from the values protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment 's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 
. ... 
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MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JusTICE REHN-
QUIST joins, dissenting. 
This case illustrates the difficulties and confusion that 
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977) , has spawned 
and will continue to spawn. For reasons I stated in dissent 
in Chadwick, id., at 18-22 and 24, I continue to feel that that 
decision was wrong. 
The Court today, in what may be a somewhat gratuitous 
approach (see MR. JusTICE STEVENS' concurrence, ante), goes 
farther down the Chadwick road, undermines the automobile 
exception, and, while purporting to clarify the confusion occa-
sioned by Chadwick, creates, in my view, only greater difficul-
ties for law enforcement officers, for prosecutors, for those 
suspected of criminal activity, and, of course, for the courts 
themselves. Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be 
litigated are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper 
bag, and every other kind of container. 
I am unpersuaded by the Court's casual sta.tement, ante, at 
9 n. 9, that Chadwick and this case are factually similar "in 
sever~l critical respects." Even accepting Chadwick as good 
law, which I do not, this, for me, is a different case. In 
Chadwick, the defendants were arrested, and a 200-pound,· 
double-locked footlocker was seized, as the locker was being 
loaded into the open trunk of a stationary automobile. The 
relationship between the footlocker and the vehicle was suffi-
ciently attenuated that the Government chose not to argue in 
this Court that the automobile exception applied. 433 U. S.,. 
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at 11. Here, in contrast, the Little Rock police stopped a 
taxicab on a busy highway at the height of late afternoon 
traffic. They had probable cause to believe the ta.xi contained 
contraband narcotics. They opened the trunk, and briefly 
examined the contents of a small unlocked suitcase inside. 
The State has vigorously contended throughout these proceed~ 
ings that the warrantless search of the trunk a.nd the unlocked 
suitcase was constitutionally permissible under the automobile· 
exception. 
I fully agree. If "contraband goods concealed and illegally 
transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched 
for without a warrant," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 
132, 153 (1925), then, in my view, luggage and similar con-
tainers found in an automobile may be searched for contra~ 
band without a warrant. The luggage, like the automobile 
transporting it, is mobile. And the expectation of privacy in 
a suitcase found in the car is probably not significantly greater 
than the expectation of privacy in a locked glove compartment 
or trunk. 
To be sure, as I acknowledged in Chadwick, 433 U.S., at 19, 
impounding the luggage without searching it would be a less 
intrusive altern~ttive than searching it on the spot. But this 
Court has not distinguished between the "lesser" intrusion of 
a seizure and the "greater" intrusion of a search, either with 
respect to automobiles, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 
51-52 ( 1970), or with respect to persons subject to custodial 
arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973) .* 
*The Court stated in Chambers, 399 U. S., at 51-52: 
"Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the 
immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is 
obtained; arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible until the magis-
trate authorizes the 'greater.' But which is the 'greater' and which the 
'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend 
on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no dif-
ference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before present-
ing the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying 
QUt an immediate search without a warrant." 
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And I see no reason to impose such a distinction here. Given 
the significant encroachment on privacy interests entailed by 
a, seizure of personal property, the additional intrusion of a 
search may well be regarded as incidental. Moreover, the 
additional protection provided by a search warrant will likely 
be minimal. Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable 
cause to seize the property, we can assume that a warrant will 
be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of 
cases. Finally, the carving out of a special warrant require-
ment for one type of personal property, but not for others, 
will impose untoward costs on the criminal justice systems of 
this country in terms of added delay .and uncertainty. 
The impractical nature of the Court's line-drawing is 
brought into focus if one places himself in the position of the 
policeman confronting an automobile that properly has been 
stopped. In approaching the vehicle and its occupants, the 
officer must divide the world of personal property into three 
groups. If there is probable cause to arrest the occupants, 
then under Ckimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), he may 
search objects within the occupants' immediate control, with 
or without probable cause. If there is probable cause to 
search the automobile itself, then under Carroll and Chambers 
the entire interior area of the automobile may be searched, 
with or without a warrant. But under Chadwick and the 
present case, if any suitcase-like object is found in the car 
outside the immediate control area of the occupants, it can-
not be searched, in the absence of exigent circumstances, with-
out a warrant. 
The inherent opaqueness of these "principles," in terms of 
the policies underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments, and the confusion to be created for all concerned, is 
readily illustrated. Suppose a portable luggage-container-
rack is affixed to the top of the vehicle. Is the arresting offi-
cer constitutionally able to open this on the spot, on the theory 
that it is like the car's trunk, or must he remove it and take 
it to the station for a warrant, on the theory that it is like 
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the 200-pound footlocker in Chadwick? Or suppose there is 
probable cause to arrest persons seated in the front seat of the 
automobile, and a suitcase rests on the back seat. Is that 
suitcase within the area of immediate control, such that the 
Chadwick-Sanders rules do not apply? Or suppose the arrest-
ing officer opens the car'$ trunk and finds that it contains an 
array of containers-an orange crate, a lunch bucket, an I 
attache case, a duffelbag, a cardboa.rd box, a backpack, tote-
bag, and a paper bag. Which of these ma.y be searched imme-
diately, and which are so "personal'' that they must be 
impounded for future search only pursuant to a warrant? 
The problems of distinguishing between "luggage" and "some 
integral part of the automobile," ante, at 10; between luggage 
that is -within the "immediate control" of the arrestee and 
luggage that is not; and between "personal luggage" and other: 
"containers and packages" such as those most curiously 
described, ante, at 11 n. 13, will be legion. The lines that 
will be drawn will not make much sense in terms of the 
policies of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Anq 
the heightened possibilities for error will mean that many con-
victions will be overturned, highly relevant evidence again will 
be excluded, and guilty persons will be set free in return for 
little apparent gain in precise and clearly understood consti-
tutional analysis. 
In my view, it would be better to adopt a clea.r-cut rule 
to the effect that a warrant should not be required to seize and 
search any personal property found in an automobile that may 
in turn be seized and searched without a w~rra.nt pursuant to 
Carroll and Chambers. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U. S., at 21-22, and n. 13 (dissenting opinion). Such an ap-
proach would simplify the constitutional law of criminal 
procedure without seriously derogating from the values pro-
tected by the Fourth Ame11dment's prohibition of unreason-
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.inp:rttttt <!fourl of tqt ~~$Statts 
Jlasfringhttt. ~. <!f. 2U~~~ 
May 9, 1979 
PERSONAL 
Re: 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Lewis: 
I have been holding back in this case to see your response 
to the dissent. As I see it, the error of the dissent is 
treating this as an "automobile" case. It is not. Here, as 
was the case in Chadwick, probable cause to seize the case 
containing the contraband existed before the respondent ever 
set foot in the taxicab and before the case was placed in the 
trunk of the car. The fact that the case was being carried in 
an automobile at the time of the stop does not turn this into 
an "automobile" case for the police never had any reason to 
suspect the car itself as harboring the contraband. The 
probable cause that existed did not target the car itself as in 
any way as suspect. It was the hand carried suitcase that was 
the suspected locus of the contraband before it entered a 
"neutral" car. Here, as in Chadwick, the relationship between 
the car and the contraband for which the police were looking 
was purely coincidental. In light of the dissent, I think you 
need to drive the point home more forcefully than you do; I 
hope you will do so when you respond to the dissent. Your 
repeated references to the automobile (6 times) may mislead 
some into thinking you regard this as an "automobile" search 
case. 
Like John, I think it might be a different case if the 
police had probable cause to suspect the car as the locus of 
contraband, as opposed to a particular suitcase hand carried. 
Though I am not sure we would want to reach any different 
result in such a case, I am inclined to agree with John's 
suggestion that we leave the proper result in a real 
"automobile" case open at this time. --
I hope you will be willing to consider doing so. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
1;;\rdfj 
' ' 
May 10, 1979 
Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for the thoughtful comments contained 
in your note to me of May 9 concerning my opinion for the 
Court in this case.~ , ~ ~ ~ 
Although I- cem ~ ~~e-~tioR-.¥JJu 
~' I have the same reservations about adopting your 
suggestions as I did about John Stevens' suggestions 
contained in his memorandum to me of April 4. Like you, 
John wished to narrow the holding of the Court in this 
case to deal only with those situations in which the 
police have probable cause to believe contraband in 
contained in a partcular piece of luggage. He did not 
want to comment in any way on the situation where the 
probable cause pertains to the automobile generally. 
. ~~l~, 
As I recall, we took th1s case 1n order t
clarify the law of search and seizure involving 
automobiles and luggage. In order to provide the police 
and trial courts with workable rules in this difficult 
area, I believe it is necessary to lay down some broad 
rules that do not turn on subtle distinctions. Moreover, 
it was my understanding from Conference that this was the 
view of the majority of our Brethren. This understanding 
is confirmed, I believe by the "join" notes of both Bill 
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall. I beleve that the opinion 
as now written best serves this end by eliminating the 
need for those applying Fourth Amendment principles to 
consider whether their probable cause applies to entire 
automobiles or only portions thereof. As I said to John 
in my memorandum of April 6, if the police have probable 
cause to search an automobile, but have no reason to 
believe contraband is contained in a particular piece of 
luggage found in the automobile, then they may search the 
rest of the vehicle and, finding nothing, then obtain a 
warrant for the search of the luggage. 
Despite my reluctance to follow your recommended 




May 11, 1Q79 
77-1497 Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your note of Mav 9 sugaestinq a 
possible modification of my opinion for the Court in this 
case. 
Your suggestion is substantially the same as that 
made by John in his memorandum to me of Aoril 4. You and he 
woul~ prefer to limit thP holding of the Court to situations 
in which the police have probable cause to believe that 
contraband is contained in a particular piece of luqgaqe, 
thereby avoiding any discussion of "the auto'llobilP 
excention". 
This certainly woul~ be one way to write the casP. 
My understanding, however, was that we took this 
case with the hope of clarifying whether Chadwick applied to 
a piece of luggage in a movinq automobile steppe~ on probable 
cause. The principal argument of the state of Arkansas was: 
"The search here was clearly reasonable as being 
made under the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment". Br. o. 6, 7, 
16-31. 
The oral argument, as I recall, also focused on the 
applicability of the automobile exception. And my 
recollection is that we discussed this case at Confer.encP 
primarily in liqht of this argument. 
I have thought that it would be helpful to make 







expecta tion of privacy, is not subiect to the automobile 
exception. As I have a Court for this view, I am naturaJlv 
reluctant to und~rtake what would he view~d as a maior chnnqe 
at this time. 
Sincerely, 




Re: 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judg 
I concur in the Court's judgment but cannot join its 
unnecessarily broad opinion, which seems to treat this 
case as if it involved the "automobile" exception to the 
warrant requirement. It is not such a case. 
~ecause the police officers had probable cause to 
believe that respondent's green suitcase contained 
marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the 
taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before 
opening it is clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1 (1977) J The essence of our holding in Chadwick is 
that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in the 
contents of a trunk or suitcase accompanying or carried by 
a person. That expectation of privacy is not diminished 
.. -" 
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by the fact that the owner's arrest occurs in a public 
place. Whether arrested in a hotel ' lobby, an airport, a 
railroad terminal, or on a public street as here, the 
owner has the right to expect that the contents of his 
luggage will not, without his consent, be exposed on 
demand of the police. If not carrying contraband, many 
persons might choose under the circumstances to consent to 
a search of their luggage to obviate any delay in securing 
their release, which would necessarily be the case if 
consent is not given. But even if wholly innocent, some 
persons might well prefer not to have the contents of 
their luggage exposed in a public place. They may stand 
on their right to privacy and require a search warrant. 
The warrant requirement is not so onerous as to command 
suspension of Fourth Amendment guarantees once the 
receptable involved is securely in the control of the 
police as it was here after Sanders' arrest. 
The breadth of the Court's opinion and its repeated 
references to the "automobile" from which respondent's 
suitcase was seized at the time of his arrest, however, 
might lead the reader to believe -- as the dissenters 
apparently do -- that this case involves the "automobile" 
exception to the warrant requirement. See ante, at 9-12. 
It does not. Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage 
being transported by respondent a~ the time of the arrest, 
,· 
3 
not the automobile in which it was carried, that was the 
suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship 
between the automobile and the contraband was purely 
coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase 
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of 
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 
"automobile" exception case. The Court need say no more. 
[This case simply does not present the question of 
whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when 
the police have probable cause to believe contraband is 
located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not 
know whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage 
in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in 
some part of the car's structure. I am not sure whether 
that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a 
warrant, but it seems to me it would be better to await a 
ase in which that question necessarily must be decidedJ 
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a 
"clear" rule, presumably one capable of resolving future 
Fourth Amendment litigation. That is not cause for 
lament, however desirable it might be to fashion a 
universal prescription governing the myriad of Fourth 
Amendment cases that might arise. We are construing the 
Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for law 
enforcement officers. My disagreement with the Court's 
, . . 
4 
opinion is very different from that of the dissenters. 
Our institutional practice, based on hard experience, 
generally has been to refrain from deciding questions not 
presented by the facts of a case; there are risks in 
formulating constitutional rules broader than required by 
the facts to which they are applied. Ashwander v. TVA, 
297 u.s. 288, 346-48 (1936). 
/ 
................. 
i:cu< llr. Justice Brennan f-,1-:f. 
Kr. Justice Stewa~t 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justioe Marshall 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. JusticG Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chief Justice 
JUN 7 19/~ Circulated:------
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Re: 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE 
STEVENS joins, concurring in the judgment. 'ko~ 
I concur in the Court's judgment but cannot join its 
unnecessarily broad opinion, which seems to treat this 
case as if it involved the "automobile" except~on to the 
warrant requirement. It is not such a case. 
Because the police officers had probable cause to 
believe that respondent's green suitcase contained 
marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the 
taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before 
opening it is clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433 
U.S. 1 {1977). The essence of our holding in Chadwick is 
that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in the 
contents of a trunk or suitcase accompanying or carried by 
a person. That expectation of privacy is not diminished 
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by the fact that the owner's arrest occurs in a public 
place. Whether arrested in a hotel lobby, an airport, a 
railroad terminal, or on a public street as here, the 
owner has the right to expect that the contents of his 
luggage will not, without his consent, be exposed on 
demand of the police. If not carrying contraband, many 
persons arrested in such circumstances might choose to 
consent to a search of their luggage to obviate any delay 
in securing their release. But even if wholly innocent, 
some persons might well prefer not to have the contents of 
their luggage exposed in a public place. They may stand 
on their right to privacy and require a search warrant. 
The warrant requirement is not so onerous as to command 
suspension of Fourth Amendment guarantees once the 
receptable involved is securely in the control of the 
police, as it was here after Sanders' arrest. 
The breadth of the Court's opinion and its repeated 
references to the "automobile" from which respondent's 
suitcase was seized at the time of his arrest, however, 
might lead the reader to believe -- as the dissenters 
apparently do -- that this case involves the "automobile" 
exception to the warrant requirement. See ante, at 9-12. 
It does not. Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage 
being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest, 
3 
not the automobile in which it was being carried, that was 
the suspected locus of the contraband • . The relationship 
between the automobile and the contraband was purely 
coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase 
was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of 
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 
"automobile" exception case. The Court need say no more. 
This case simply does not present the question of 
whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when 
the police have probable cause to believe contraband is 
located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not 
know whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage 
in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in 
some part of the car's structure. I am not sure whether 
that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a 
warrant, but it seems to me it would be better to await a 
case in which that question necessarily must be decided. 
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a 
"clear" rule, presumably one capable of resolving future 
Fourth Amendment litigation. That is not cause for 
lament, however desirable it might be to fashion a 
universal prescription governing the myriad of Fourth 
Amendment cases that might arise. We are construing the 
Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for law 
enforcement officers. My disagreement with the Court's 
4 
opinion is very different from that of the dissenters. 
Our institutional practice, based on hard experience, 
generally has been to refrain from deciding questions not 
presented by the facts of a case; there are risks in 
formulating constitutional rules broader than required by 
the facts to which they are applied. Ashwander v. TVA, 
297 u.s. 288, 346-48 (1936) 
~UVf"tUU ~O'lttf llf tlrt ~ttlt ~httt$ 
Jrulfittghtn. ~. ~· 2ll~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 7, 1979 
Re: 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders 
Dear Lewis: 
Since I will be joining the Chief's separate 
concurrence, I will withdraw my separate opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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(Oral Sta7 tent from Bench) -
The question presented in this case/ is whether 
police lawfully may search~personal luggage without a 
----warrant, where the luggage is taken from an automobile;' ..----, 
stopped on the stree)fpursuant to probable cause to believ~ 
that the luggage contains contraband. 
Police in Little Rock, Arkansas, were advised by a 
reliable informant;'that respondent would arrive at the 
airport, carrying a green suitcas~containing marijuana. 
Upon his arrival, respondent - with a green suitcase - took a 
€~ and proceeded to leave the airport. The police stopped 
·~ vt the cab, searched t~ ~tom6ai~e, and - finding the suitcase 
..4-")(~ de. ~1¥ 
in the trunk - opened and ~earcheG it without a warrant. 
"'\ 
They found ten pounds of packa~~d marijuana, evidence used to 
convict respondent. 
It is settled law that, / absent unusual 
circumstances,j the Fourth Amendment requires / that a search be 
both reasonabl jland performed pursuant to a warrant. One of 
the few exceptions to this warrant requiremen~applies 
generally to automobiles. Because of their mobility,j it 
often is impractical;'to obtain a warrant before the vehicle 
itself is searched. Moreover, there is only a limited 
expectation of privacy~with respect to what one carries in an 
automobile. 
w~~~~~ ~  
u.s. v?-4~ 
2. 
fw-d .j..J. --.. ~~ 
We held, however, - in United States v. Chad~, A 
that personal luggage - as to which there normally / is a high 
expectation of privacy - may not be searched without a ____.. 
warrant. 
Applying this rule, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
reversed respondent's conviction ;Jholding that even though 
the personal luggage was taken from an automobile;'validly 
stopped,j a warrant was necessary. 
Arkansas. 
We affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of ~ 
~ ;,A,.,/"t~t ·'lt.. ..,; 
that personal luggage~ found with1n We do not think 
an automobile;fcomes within the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement. There was no danger that the luggage, 
~~~ ,;.~ j.L~~{ 
once seized, could - like an automobile - moue awa.~ wriile a · 
warrant was being sought. 
~ This holding protects the privacy interest in 
~ personal luggage ;fand it should not handicap police~in the 
performance of their duty. In this case, the Little Rock 
Police, up to the time they opened the luggage, had acted 
efficiently and commendably. They should, however, have 
taken respondent and his suitcase/ to the station hou;;'where 
an independent magistrate / could determine whether the 
issuance of a warrant was appropriate. 
The Chief Justice has filed a separate opinion 
/ 
3. 
concurring in the judgment, in which Mr. Justice Stevens has 
joined. Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting opinion 
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June 20, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497 
N{ne cases have been held for Arkansas v. 
Sanders: United States v. Stevie, No. 18-971~ Robbins v. 
California, No. 78-567~ DeMarco v. United States, No. 78-
5712~ sink v. United States, No. 78-60~8~ DeSantis v. New 
York, No. 78-6076: Grim v. United States, No. 78-6088: 
GaUitney v. United States, No. 78-6098: Adams v. Illinois, 
No. 78-g283: and Guzman v. Louisiana, No. 78-6319. 
1 • No. 78-971 (Cert to 
The facts in Sievie ar~ almost identical to those 
in Arkansas v. Sanders. Acting on a tip, DEA agents 
observed as respondents retrieved two suitcases from the 
bag9age claim area of an airport, entered an automobile, 
and drove away. Because of respondents' suspicious 
actions and ,the tip,. the agents ptilled the auto over and, 
upon smellinq marijuana, took the suitcases from the 
trunk, searched them, and 'found marijuana. The Eighth 
Circuit, acting en bane, reversed respondents' convictions 
for possession of mariiuana, relying on United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977). ' 
The Government argues that this case is 
controlled by whatever ' this Court decides in Arkansas v. 
Sanders: Indeed, the Solicitor General specifically 
states that, "[i]f ••• the Court affirms the judgment of the 
Arkansas Supreme Court in Sanders, ,this petition should be 
denied." I will vote to follow the Soli6itor General's 
suggestion and deny certiorari. Although the DEA agents 
did not receive information specifically concerning the 
suitcases, by the time of the search they had probable 
cause with respect to them. The situation posed by the 
Chi~f Ju~tice in Sanders therefore is not p~esented here. 
Although · the Solic1tor General mentions in a footnote the 
issue _of the retroactive application of Chadwick, and . 
notes t Ji a t there is a division among the c1rcu1ts on the 
·~fl] 
que~tion, he does not Court to qrant certiorari 
to decide the issue. We did not'-"specifically consider the •:! 
retroactive -application of Chadwick in Sanders because it 
was n_ot raised -by tthe 1:par'ties . We did, however, rely upon 
Chad~ick · in ruling on the constitutionality of a pre~ 
Chadwick search. Although we may at some point have to . 
take up this question, . I would prefer ·to wait and see how 
the lower courts resoond to Sanders. r~herefore will 
vote to deny certior_ari in United Stateft v. Stevie, No. 
78...:971. .,;~ ,, 
Robbins v. California, No. 78-567 
Cal. Ct. App. ) 
r ~ 
"":i- ,,, '· 
~. IJ1&,. Robbins ,po.pce ~ stopped petitioner because 
~ was driving erratlcally, and, when the.y observed his 
demeanor and smelled the inside of his automobile, 
arrested him for driving under the influence pf ~ marijuana~ 
He thereupon informed the ' Y>qlice that "what you are.' ';; 
~ looking for: is in the 'back." Upon s'earqhinq . his auto, 
they discovered two suitcases and two sealed packages, in 
r each of ~which they di~co~ered "marijuana. The California 
Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, ruling 
that the s~arch was ·..ralid under t'he automobile exception 
to the ~varrant Clause, ·and . that Chadwick did not apply- · ;, 
because the officers did not have an opportunity to obtain 
a warrant before stopping the auto and because the contact 
bet~een the auto and the ~~itcases ~as more extended than 
in Gnadwick.. '~~ ~ 
c 
The rationale of the California 
with our ruling in Arkansas v. Sanders. ' Nonetheless, we 
should afford t,he Ca1ifornia court an opportunity to 
consider whether the otherwise invalid search was 
consented to wnen petitioner suqqested the police look~nin 
the ·back." I therefore will vote to ·grant, vacate, and 
remand No. 78-567 in ligh~t of the Court's decision in 
Arkansas v. Sanders. 
3. DeMarco 
to cAi) > 
DeMarco petitioner was stopped after driving 
erratically and be1ng abusive to the police. Wh~n ~he 
officers observed a larqe. knife in petitioner's • 





controlled substances." After handcuffing him and placing 
him in the patrol car, the police searched petitioner's 
belonqings and there found a zippered case containing 
cocaine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed petitioner's 
conviction, finding that there was probable cause for the 
arrest and that the search had been incident to the 
arrest. 
Petitioner's search and seizure claim was 
disposed of below without any reference to the automobile 
exception to the Warrant Clause. There is no reason to 
grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light of 
Arkansas v. Sanders, therefore, as the rationale used by 
the courts in DeMarco has nothing to do with the rationale 
of Sanders. I see no point in reviewing the correctness 
of the lower courts' conclusion that the facts of this 
case fall within the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
I therefore will vote to deny certior.ari in No. 78-5712 • . 
4. Sink v. United States, No. 78-6058 (Cert to 
CAS), & 
'· Petitioners in Sink and Grim were known by the 
police to be enqaqed in passing counterfeit currency. 
After following petitioners in a high speed chase, police 
stopped petitioners' automobile and arrested a third 
member of the group. Upon •patting down• Petitioners, the 
police discovered several packages of counterfeit bills. 
The police thereuoon seized the automobile under 49 u.s.c. 
S78i, which permits the Government to seize ,and forfeit 
any vehicle used to transport counterfeit currency. The 
vehicle was towed to the Sheriff's Department and the 
police inventoried it, discovering a zippered shoulder bag 
containing a larqe number of bills. They immediately 
closed the bag, obtained a warrant for its search, and 
returned to find that it contained $31,000 in counterfeit 
currency. 
On appeal, the court upheld the search of the 
zippered bag, ruling that it was within the automobile 
excevtion to the warrant clause, or, alternatively, that 
it was a proper search incident to the federal forfeiture 




that Chadwick would not ' apply to searches, such as this, 
that occurred prior to the Court's decision in that case. 
There appear to be several possible 
justifications for the search that would have nothing to 
do wi~~ the automobile excepti~n addressed in Sande~s ~ . . . , "1 
The . eventual search was pursuant to a warrant, the lnitlal~" 
search' rnay have been a proper inventory search under South 
Dakota-· v. Opperman, ,428 u.s . 364 C1976)(although there was 
no evidence adduced concerning the regular police 
procedures for sue~ searches), ~nd ii appears that under 
the federal 'forfeiture statute the automobile no lonqer 
belonged to petitioners in any event. Once again there "iS 
the lurking issue of the retroact~ive . application of 
Chadwick, but, as 'with United St~tes v. Stevie, No. 78-
971, I would defer this ,question for the time being. 
Accordingly , I wil L vote' to deny certiorari in both No. 
78-6058 and No. 78-6088. 
6. 78-6076 (Cert to 
1' 
In DeSantis Pol ice, acting on a tip from ~an 
airline employee ~ho · had seen marijuana in petitioner's 
suitcase, apprehended pe titioner as he picked up his bag 
from the baggage cl'aim area. They arrested him and took 
• him to a ·police subst·a·tion located tdthin ,. tbe airport, 
where the bag was searched and fh~ marijuana found : ~he 
New York Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's ~ 
conviction, ruling that the search was incident to his 
lawful arrest. ~he dissenters ar~ued that Chadwick 
required . reversal. 
'• 
,. As in DeMarco v. United ,States, No. 78-5712, 
there is no automobile exception , issue in this case '·as the 
. courts below decided it. There is therefore no point in 
asking ·· the New .. York court to reconsider its decision in 
1 ight of Arkansas v. Sanders . There may~ be substant'ial 
qu~stions concerning the application of th~ search~·-
. incident to arrest doctrine ' to the facts of this case, but 
I would nq~ · wish to grant certiorari merely to review this 
limited questi9n. I therefore will vote to deny 





7. No. 78-6098 (Cert 
Petitioner in Gaultney was involved in a sale of 
cocaine to DEA agents. One of his partners had arranged 
to deliver the merchandise to the agents and was about to 
get it from his truck~ when the agents arrested him. In · 
the truck they found a "Scrabble" box containing the 
cocaine. , The agents then proceeded to a house where they 
knew petitioner to be, entered without a warrant, and 
arrested petitioner. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial 
court's decision to suppress the evidence, finding that 
unde~ the automobile exception to "the Warrant Clause the 
search of the box had been justified. T-he court , · 
distinguished Chadwick, . finding that here there were 
exigent circumstances justifying the search, and that 
there were diminished , expectations of privacy {because the 
seller w~s .about to give the box to the agents). The 
court also upheld petitioner's arrest, finding that ,there 
was probable cause and exigent circumst~nces justifying 
it. 
There aie substantial st~nding problems under 
Rakas v. Illinois conderning the . ~earch and seizure claim, 
as only petitioner seeks certioriri and it appears that 
only petitioner's parfner had any substantial ihtere~t in 
the truck that was searched. Moreover, I qu~stion whether 
the nature of a "Scrabble" box precludes any substantial 
expecta tion of privacy , therein. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 
n. 13. But the issue of the propriety of petitioner's 
arrest seems a substantial, one that is related to that 
presen'ted in Payton v. New York, No. 78-5~ 20, s.et for. 1:. 
reargument next Term. I therefore will vote to hold No. 
78-6098 for No. 78-5420. 
8. ' Adams v. Illinois, No. 
· Ct. App.) 
Petitioner ,in Adams was arrested for 
violation and his automobile was seized by the oolice. ·~· 
Several days after petitioner had be"'en re.leased ~ the 
police discovered that the automobile, which petitioner 
had not claimed, was stolen. They contacted the owner, 
who oP,ened the tr,unk for the police, where they found a 
shotgun and three suitcases belonging to petitioner. In ' 
the suitcases, the oolice found various items taken during 
' . ·' 
•' • 
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